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RECENT  ECONOMIC AND POLICY DEVELOPMENTS in the areas  of stabiliza- 
tion, allocation,  and  distribution'  help  explain  the current  political  mood  in 
some  parts  of the United States  in favor of greater  protectionism. 
In the area of macroeconomic  stabilization,  anti-inflationary  policies in 
1968-71  led to an undesirably  high rate of unemployment.  For a number 
of reasons,  these  had only limited  success  in reducing  the rate of inflation 
at the hoped-for speed; the result was the price controls imposed on 
August 15, 1971. The inflation, an increasingly  overvalued  dollar, and 
business  cycle  developments  here  and abroad  placed  pressure  on both our 
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ability  to export  and on U.S. industries  that compete with imports,  de- 
pressing  the U.S. merchandise  trade  balance  from a $3.8 billion surplus 
in 1967  to a $2.7 billion  deficit  in 1971. 
Second, over the past five years, allocation  policy in the international 
area  has changed.  The Kennedy  Round tariff  cuts were  staged  to reduce 
U.S. and foreign  nonagricultural  tariff  rates  by 35 percent  over  the period 
1968-72,  and in a period  of increasing  overvaluation  of the dollar,  helped 
ease the pressure  on the U.S. export sector. However, in the import- 
competing  sector,  the U.S. tariff  cuts  served  only  to create  additional  strain. 
While they were rational on allocational  grounds,  and relatively  small 
(probably  involving only a 3- to  5-percentage-point  effect on import 
prices),  their  timing  unfortunately  coincided  with  an increase  in the aggre- 
gate unemployment  rate from 3.6 percent  in January  1968  to 5.9 percent 
in January  1972. 
Third,  distribution  policy failed to neutralize  the shifts occurring  in the 
international  sector.  The  Trade  Expansion  Act of 1962  provided  that  parties 
injured  by trade  liberalization  could receive  either  adjustment  assistance 
(technical,  financial,  tax) or import  relief  through  an escape  clause,  or  both. 
Until recently,  because  of the wording  of the act, the U.S. Tariff  Commis- 
sion has found  it difficult  to determine  that injury  to domestic  parties  was 
caused  "in major  part"  by tariff  concessions.2  The result  has been an in- 
creasing  use of "voluntary"  restrictive  agreements  between  the United 
States  and.countries  exporting  some  sensitive  products  to us. Nevertheless, 
if the increased  political  activities  of protectionists  are  any  gauge  of the in- 
come losses of import-competing  industries,  the Trade  Expansion  Act of 
1962 and subsequent  policy have failed to  compensate  adequately  for 
2. See, for example,  Tracy  W. Murray  and Michael  R. Egmand,  "Full Employment, 
Trade Expansion and Adjustment Assistance," Southern  Economic  Journal, Vol. 36 
(April 1970),  pp. 404-24, for a discussion  of these difficulties.  In "Policy  Problems  in the 
Adjustment  Process (U.S.)" (paper delivered  to the Seminar  on Industrialization  and 
Trade Policies in the 1970s, International  Bank for Reconstruction  and Development, 
October  1972; processed),  Robert E. Baldwin  and John H. Mutti note that from Octo- 
ber 1962 to November 1969, all twenty-six  petitions  to the U.S. Tariff  Commission  by 
industries,  firms, and workers  were denied. From November 1969 to March 1972, 16 
out of 108 cases involving  workers'  adjustment  assistance  heard  by the commission  were 
decided  in favor of the workers  while in another  28 cases the votes were evenly  divided; 
15 out of 23 cases involving  firms  were  even or decided  in favor  of the firm  while 7 out of 
10 industry-wide  cases were decided  in favor of the industry.  (In case of a tied vote, the 
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shifts  in the distribution  of income  occasioned  by trade  liberalization,  and 
intensified  by high domestic  unemployment.3 
Thus,  stabilization  policy  in recent  years  has fallen  short  of the goals of 
slowing inflation,  avoiding high unemployment,  and attaining  external 
equilibrium.  On the other  hand, a rational  allocation  policy of reciprocal 
tariff  reduction  was successfully  implemented.  Both of these  policies,  how- 
ever, led to a redistribution  of income away from resources  in import- 
competing  industries.  Leaving  aside  the question  of whether  these  resources 
should  be compensated,  the existing  policy  mechanisms  for handling  redis- 
tribution  problems  in the international  sector  probably  did  not compensate 
these  resources  sufficiently  to eliminate  their  losses  relative  to the rest  of the 
economy. 
Regardless  of the cause,  certain  groups  continue  to urge  increased  pro- 
tection.  Should  U.S. imports  be restricted  to obtain  a higher  level  of aggre- 
gate employment  or a distribution  of income  more  favorable  to the factors 
of production  in import-competing  industries?  More important,  can wel- 
fare  be increased  in the United States  as a whole with greater  protection? 
The  purpose  of this  paper  is to provide  some  rough  estimates  of the welfare 
effects  in the United States  of both existing  protection  and greater  protec- 
tion. To use a concrete  example  of the possibilities  for increased  protection, 
I shall examine  Title III of a widely  discussed  bill introduced  by Senator 
Vance  Hartke  of Indiana  and Representative  James  A. Burke  of Massa- 
chusetts,  in the Ninety-second  Congress.4 
The first  section  presents  a general  discussion  of free  trade  and the ap- 
propriateness  of trade restrictions  as tools of government  policy. The 
second section considers  the welfare  costs of existing  trade restrictions 
and provides  a framework  for the analysis  of the Burke-Hartke  proposal5 
3. The act does not provide  for assistance  to export-  or import-competing  sectors  due 
to overvaluation  of the dollar or the recent  cyclical developments  that have affected  the 
U.S. trade position. Also, it is possible that the problems  of import-competing  areas 
are attributable  largely  to the aggregate  level of unemployment  and that this sector is 
attempting  to use trade policy to improve  its position, an option not open to the non- 
traded  goods sector. 
4. S. 2592 and H.R. 10914,  92 Cong. 1 sess., both introduced  September  28, 1971. 
5. Several  important  works on trade  restrictions  are used frequently  in this analysis: 
Baldwin  and Mutti, "Policy  Problems";  Giorgio Basevi, "The Restrictive  Effect of the 
U.S. Tariff and Its Welfare Value," American  Economic  Review, Vol. 58 (September 
1968), pp. 840-52; W. M. Corden,  The Theory  of Protection  (Oxford:  Clarendon  Press, 
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in the third  section.  The final  sections  provide  first  some caveats  and then 
a summary. 
Free  Trade  vs. Restrictions 
MOTIVATIONS  FOR FREE TRADE 
The primary  motivation  for free  trade  is that it permits  a country  to im- 
port  products  that  can  be produced  cheaply  abroad  in exchange  for  products 
that  can  be produced  cheaply  at home.  Two primary  gains  arise  from  inter- 
national  trade,  the consumption  gain and the production  gain.6  The first 
arises  because  consumers  can purchase  goods at a list of world  prices  that 
are  below  the internal  prices  that  would  prevail  in the absence  of trade,  the 
second  from  the ability  of producers  to shift  their  activity  toward  products 
in which  they are  relatively  efficient.  Both gains  increase  consumer  welfare 
since trade  increases  income  and provides  consumers  with an alternative 
set of market  prices.  In principle,  a country's  tradeable  products  can be 
ranked  from those of greatest  comparative  advantage  to those of least. 
The country obtains both the production  and consumption  gains from 
trade  by increasing  production  and exporting  those high on the list and 
reducing  production  and importing  those low on the list. If foreigners 
place  tariffs  on the exports  of a country  and that country  places  tariffs  on 
imported  goods,  the gains  from  free  trade  and specialization  in production 
are reduced.  If each tariff  level is sufficiently  high, trade will cease alto- 
gether  and  the country  will  revert  to the welfare  position  it would  have  had 
in the absence  of trade. 
The  proposition  that  tariffs  can offset  the benefits  of comparative  advan- 
tage in a multiple-product  context  has been illustrated  in a study of 1937 
Unwin, 1971); Ilse Mintz, U.S. Import  Quotas:  Costs  and Consequences,  AEI Domestic 
Affairs  Study 10 (American  Enterprise  Institute,  forthcoming);  Robert M. Stern, "The 
U.S. Tariff and the Efficiency  of the U.S. Economy," in American  Economic Associa- 
tion, Papers  and  Proceedings  of the Seventy-sixth  Annual  Meeting,  1963 (American  Eco- 
nomic  Review,  Vol. 54, May 1964), pp. 459-70; Robert M. Stern, "Tariffs and Other 
Measures  of Trade Control: A Survey  of Recent Developments,"  Journal  of Economic 
Literature,  forthcoming; and U.S.  Department of  Agriculture,  Economic Research 
Service,  Measures  of the  Degree  and  Cost  of Economic  Protection  ofAgriculture  in  Selected 
Countries,  Technical  Bulletin 1384 (1967). 
6. See Harry  G. Johnson,  "The Cost of Protection  and the Scientific  Tariff,"  Journal 
of Political  Economy,  Vol. 68 (August 1960),  pp. 327-45, reprinted  in Johnson, Aspects 
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trade  by MacDougall.  He showed  that  in product  areas  in which  the  United 
States  had a comparative  advantage,  U.K. tariff  rates  were  high and that 
U.S. tariff  rates  were  high  in areas  where  the United  Kingdom  had a com- 
parative  advantage.7  Relatively  high average  tariff rates in the United 
States  held the U.S. share of U.K. exports  of manufactures  to only 4.5 
percent,  while 11 percent  of U.S. exports of manufactures  went to the 
United  Kingdom  in 1937.  Thus,  tariffs  largely  dissipated  the bilateral  gain 
to trade  between  the two countries. 
If the world moved to free trade in manufactured  products,  what re- 
sources  would  the  United  States  be able  to utilize  more  efficiently?  Since  the 
United States  has large  endowments  of skilled  labor and of research  and 
development  facilities  relative  to the rest of the world,  restrictions  on the 
country's  exports  reduce  its ability  to exploit  its comparative  advantage  by 
exporting  products  using such resources.8  On the import  side, since the 
United States  has little semiskilled  and unskilled  labor relative  to the rest 
of the world,  import-competing  industries  presumably  will tend to release 
relatively  more  of this type of labor.  In 1967,  manufacturing  wage  rates  in 
import-competing  industries  were only $2.66 per hour (excluding  quota 
items)  compared  with $2.84  in all manufacturing  and $3.16  in the export 
industries.9  Also, Ball  has offered  1962  cross-sectional  evidence  that effec- 
tive rates  of protection  are  high in low-wage  areas  and vice versa.10  Thus, 
7. G. D. A. MacDougall, "British and American  Exports: A Study Suggested  by 
the Theory of Comparative  Costs," Economic  Journal,  Vol. 61 (December 1951), pp. 
697-724. The unweighted  average  for U.S. tariffs  was 61 percent  ad valorem  where  the 
United Kingdom  had a comparative  advantage  and 28 percent  where  she did not. 
8. See, for example, William Gruber, Dileep Mehta, and Raymond Vernon, "The 
R&D Factor in International  Trade and International  Investment of United States 
Industries,"  Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 75 (February 1967), pp. 20-37;  and 
Donald B. Keesing, "The Impact of  Research and Development on United States 
Trade,"  in the same issue, pp. 38-48. 
9. All manufacturing  is from Trade Relations Council of the United States, Inc., 
Employment,  Output,  and Foreign  Trade  of U.S. Manufacturing  Industries,  1958-69/70 
(4th ed., Washington:  TRC, 1972),  Vol. 2, p. 793. Other  wage rates were calculated  by 
Kevin Ferrell.  Actually, to prove that import-competing  industries  are relatively  inten- 
sive in unskilled  labor,  the share  of factor  rewards  going  to unskilled  labor  in such  indus- 
tries  should  exceed  their  share  in the rest  of the economy.  The evidence  that this might  be 
the case is Stage III (the standardized  product) of Raymond Vernon's product cycle 
("International  Investment  and International  Trade in the Product Cycle," Quarterly 
Journal  of Economics,  Vol. 80, May 1966, pp. 190-207). 
10. David S. Ball, "United States Effective  Tariffs and Labor's Share,"  Journal  of 
Political Economy,  Vol. 75 (April 1967), pp. 183-87. The figure on p. 185 shows the 
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elimination  of U.S. and foreign  tariffs  would shift relative  demand  in the 
United States from low-wage to  high-wage  labor and permit greater 
utilization  of U.S. technology. 
REASONS FOR TRADE RESTRICTIONS 
Although  tariffs  and quotas  eliminate  the welfare  gains  from  trade,  they 
exist  because  they  serve  goals  in at least  six areas:  domestic-political  income 
redistribution,  employment,  the balance  of payments,  international  income 
redistribution,  infant  industries,  and other  social goals. We shall consider 
each  in turn. 
Domestic  distribution  of income.  In 1941,  Stolper  and  Samuelson  showed 
that if wages  and prices  are flexible  so that full employment  can be main- 
tained,  an increase  in tariff  levels  would  decrease  the real  income  of the fac- 
tor used relatively  intensely  in export  production  and increase  the real in- 
come  of the  factor  used  relatively  intensely  in import-competing  industries.11 
Since,  by the Heckscher-Ohlin  theorem,  a country  tends  to export  products 
that use relatively  intensely  its abundant  factor,  higher  U.S. tariffs  would 
tend  to decrease  the income  of the abundant  factor-skilled labor-and in- 
crease  the income of the scarce  factor-semiskilled and unskilled  labor. 
This  effect  would  be accentuated  by any  foreign  retaliation  on U.S. exports. 
The impact  of restricted  trade  on the returns  to both capital  and land are 
unclear;12  but to the extent  that foreign  barriers  to U.S. exports  of agricul- 
tural goods could be reduced,  the return  to land should increase.  In the 
short  run,  before  relative  factor  prices  can adjust  fully,  trade  liberalization 
by the United  States  would  tend  to increase  utilization  of skilled  labor  and 
land  while  reducing  the utilization  of unskilled  labor. 
Assuming  that the nation wishes  to increase  the income of factors  in 
import-competing  industries,  the use of trade  restrictions  depends  on the 
welfare  costs they  impose  on the United  States  relative  to those of alterna- 
tive programs  such as subsidies  or excise  taxes. In a welfare  sense, trade 
11. Wolfgang F.  Stolper and Paul A. Samuelson, "Protection and Real Wages," 
Review  of Economic  Studies,  Vol. 9 (November  1941),  pp. 58-73. 
12. See, for example,  Wassily Leontief, "Domestic Production  and Foreign Trade; 
the American  Capital  Position Re-examined,"  Economia  Internazionale,  Vol. 11 (Febru- 
ary 1954),  pp. 3-32, reprinted  in Richard  E. Caves  and  Harry  G. Johnson  (eds.),  Readings 
in International  Economics  (Richard  D. Irwin,  1968),  Vol. 11, Chap. 30. See also the dis- 
cussion  by William  H. Branson  and Helen B. Junz,  "Trends  in U.S. Trade  and Compara- 
tive Advantage,"  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity  (2:1971), pp. 285-33& Stephen  P. Magee  651 
restrictions  are generally  less efficient  than alternative  mechanisms  of 
redistributing  income. 
Aggregate  employment.  Tariffs  can add  to total  employment  by stimulat- 
ing job creation  in import-competing  industries  if the economy  is at less 
than full employment.  At full employment,  the relative  price change  for 
importables  simply  alters  the composition  of employment  and not the ag- 
gregate  level  if stabilization  policy  keeps  the economy  at the same  point on 
a fixed Phillips  curve. However,  trade restrictions  are an inappropriate 
means  of stimulating  aggregate  employment.  First  and  foremost,  they  can- 
not be as efficient  as the macroeconomic  tools of monetary  and fiscal 
policy. Second, the aggregate  impact of trade restrictions  may be offset 
by foreign  retaliation.  For example,  Congress  was influenced  by the unem- 
ployment  problem  when  it passed  the Tariff  Act of 1930,  which  increased 
duties  on more  than  one  thousand  articles  of trade.'3  Within  a year  twenty- 
five foreign  countries  had raised  their  tariffs  against  American  goods in a 
tariff  war. Between  1929  and 1933  international  trade  declined  from $65 
billion  to less than $25  billion  a year,  reflecting  both declining  incomes  and 
increased  restrictions.'4 
Trade balance and balance of payments. An  increase in import  prices 
caused  by a tariff  directly  reduces  the value of imports  and improves  the 
trade  balance.  Several  factors  modify  this effect,  however.  First,  retaliation 
against  the country's  exports  may result.  Second,  there  are  indirect  reduc- 
tions in the value of exports  through  several  mechanisms:  The rise in the 
price  of imports  discourages  production  of goods that use these  imports  as 
inputs, encourages  the movement  of factors into the import-competing 
sector,  and raises  the prices  of exports  and nontraded  goods. Finally,  the 
reduction  in the value of imports  into a country  reduces  the foreign  ex- 
change  earnings  of the rest of the world  and thus the country's  exports. 
The use of the tariff  as a means  of improving  the trade  balance  and the 
balance  of payments  is symptomatic  of the failure  of other,  more general, 
mechanisms  to achieve  international  adjustment  of payments  imbalances.15 
There  is good reason  to be skeptical  about  the uses of tariffs  for providing 
13. Robert M. Norris, "U.S. Foreign Economic Policy-Progress or Regression?" 
(speech  delivered  at the annual  spring  meeting  of the New Hampshire  Bankers  Associa- 
tion, June 7, 1972; processed). 
14. N. H. Engle, "Reciprocity  in Foreign Trade Policy," Harvard  Business  Review, 
Vol. 16 (Autumn 1937),  p. 42. 
15. See Stern, "Tariffs  and Other Measures  of Trade  Control." 652  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 3:1972 
long-run  solutions  to countries'  balance-of-payments  disequilibria.  Since 
these  disequilibria  may  be simple  monetary  phenomena,  tariffs  may  not be 
the  most  appropriate  way  to approach  the  problem.  If, as  monetarists  argue, 
a balance-of-payments  deficit  is evidence  that domestic  credit  creation  ex- 
ceeds  the growth  in the domestic  demand  for cash  balances,  the proper  re- 
sponse  to the deficit  would  be to slow the growth  of domestic  credit  crea- 
tion.'6 Of course,  there are difficulties  in applying  to a reserve-currency 
country  such  as the United  States  the monetary  approach  to the balance  of 
payments.  But similar  arguments  hold for other  approaches  to the balance 
of payments.  Policies  such as greater  flexibility  in foreign  exchange  rates 
within  the band  or fully  floating  rates  would  obviate  the need  for tariffs  as 
policy tools for balance-of-payments  purposes. 
The  optimum  tariff.  If a country  is able  to influence  world  prices  through 
the volume  of its trade,  it can  increase  its welfare  in some  cases  by levying  a 
tariff,  bringing  welfare  to a maximum  by a rate  that is called  an "optimum 
tariff."  At its optimum  level the tariff  can assure  welfare  gains from im- 
proving  the terms  of trade  that more than offset  the losses caused  by the 
distortion  in domestic  production  and  consumption.  In a sense,  it operates 
like a tax on foreigners,  lowering  the net price  they receive  on items  they 
sell. Harry  G. Johnson  has shown  that  the welfare  gains  from  an optimum 
tariff  are  smaller,  the smaller  the share  of imports  in free  trade  in an econ- 
omy and  the more  elastic  the foreign  offer  curve  facing  the country.'7  Since 
the United States  has a relatively  small  ratio of imports  to domestic  pro- 
duction  and foreign  demand  is somewhat  elastic,  the gains  to the United 
States  from  an optimal  tariff  would  be relatively  small.  Table  1, reproduced 
from  Johnson's  article,  shows,  for example,  that if the elasticity  of foreign 
demand  for U.S. products  were  2.0 and the free trade  import  share  were 
0.10, the optimal  tariff  for the United States  would be 100 percent  but 
would  yield a percentage  gain in U.S. welfare  of only 1.4 percent.  Such  a 
policy  is infeasible  for several  reasons,  such  as international  political  costs 
and the likelihood  of foreign  retaliation,  which  are ignored  in Table 1. In 
practice,  the attempt  of any one country  to improve  its welfare  at the ex- 
16. Harry  G. Johnson, "The Monetary  Approach  to Balance  of Payments  Theory," 
forthcoming  in Michael B. Connolly and Alexander  K. Swoboda, International  Eco- 
nomics:  The  Geneva  Essays (London: Allen and Unwin, 1972). 
17. Harry  G. Johnson,  "The Gain from Exploiting  Monopoly or Monopsony  Power 
in International  Trade,"  Economica,  Vol. 35, New Series (May 1968), pp. 151-56, re- 
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Table 1. Relative Welfare Gain from Optimum  Tariff Policies 
Percent 
Optimum  tariff 
Elasticity  100  Import share under  free trade 
offoreign  77 -  1 
demand  (percent)  0.05  0.10  0.15  0.20  0.25  0.30  0.35  0.40  0.45  0.50 
1.10  1000  3.4  6.7  9.9  12.8  15.3  18.1  20.3  22.8  23.7  24.8 
1.20  500  2.6  5.1  7.4  9.6  11.7  13.5  15.0  16.3  17.3  18.0 
1.30  3331/3  2.1  4.1  6.0  7.6  9.2  10.6  11.7  12.6  13.4  13.8 
1.40  250  1.8  3.4  4.9  6.3  7.5  8.6  9.5  10.2  10.7  11.1 
1.50  200  1.5  2.8  3.8  5.2  6.2  7.1  7.8  8.4  8.9  9.1 
1.75  1331/3  0.9  1.8  2.5  3.4  4.1  4.7  5.2  5.6  5.8  6.1 
2.00  100  0.7  1.4  2.0  2.6  3.1  3.4  3.8  4.1  4.3  4.4 
2.25  80  0.6  1.1  1.5  2.0  2.3  2.6  2.9  3.1  3.2  3.3 
2.50  66%  0.5  0.9  1.2  1.6  1.8  2.1  2.3  2.4  2.5  2.6 
2.75  57,j  0.4  0.7  1.0  1.3  1.5  1.7  1.8  1.9  2.0  2.1 
3.00  50  0.3  0.6  0.8  1.0  1.2  1.4  1.5  1.6  1.7  1.7 
3.50  40  0.2  0.4  0.6  0.7  0.9  1.0  1.1  1.1  1.2  1.2 
4.00  331/3  0.2  0.3  0.4  0.6  0.7  0.7  0.8  0.9  0.9  0.9 
4.50  28Wi  0.1  0.2  0.3  0.4  0.5  0.6  0.6  0.7  0.7  0.7 
5.00  20  0.1  0.2  0.3  0.4  0.4  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.6  0.5 
Source: Reproduced from Harry G.  Johnson,  "The Gain from Exploiting Monopoly  or Monopsony 
Power in International Trade," Economica, Vol. 35, New Series (May 1968), p. 156, reprinted  in Harry G. 
Johnson, Aspects of the Theory  of Tariffs  (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1971). 
pense  of another  is likely  to result  merely  in a deterioration  in the welfare 
of both through  escalating  restrictions. 
"Infant  industry."  According  to the infant  industry  argument,  tariffs  can 
be levied  on manufactured  and other  products  to encourage  industrializa- 
tion of the country.'8  Once the "infant"  has matured  into a strong  eco- 
nomic entity,  the trade  restrictions  are removed.  A long-run  gain can ac- 
crue  from  the trade  restriction  only if the tariff  stimulates  a change  in the 
country's  endowment  or quality  of factors,  increases  its technical  capabil- 
ity through  learning  by doing  or some other  process,  or allows  it to exploit 
potential  economies  of scale.  Even  if economic  gains  are  achieved  through 
tariffs,  but are  delayed,  their  present  discounted  value  may  be less than  the 
present  value  of the costs imposed  by the tariff.19 
18. It is questionable  whether  the "infant  industry"  argument  applies  to the United 
States  in the current  protectionist  debate.  As one wit has put it, most of the U.S. indus- 
tries arguing  for greater  protection  are in their dotage rather  than their infancy. 
19. Nevertheless,  a number  of countries  have established  "tariff  factories"  by placing 
high tariffs  on finished  products  and low tariffs  on inputs.  The "effective  rate of protec- 
tion" indicates  the protection  provided  to the manufacture  of the  finished  product.  For 
example, in order to provide protection for an industrial  process such as automobile 
assembly,  the tariff on imports  of autos must be compared  with the tariffs  on all com- 
ponents of automobile  production.  If there are high tariffs on imports of  automobile 
components,  there  will be no encouragement  of automobile  assembly  in the country.  The 
"effective  rate of protection"  is defined  as the percentage  change  in value added in some 
activity  that is attributable  to the entire  tariff  structure.  In the introduction  to a paper by 
Humphrey,  there  is an excellent  review  of the literature  on the effective  rate  of protection 654  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 3:1972 
Other  social  goals. Many other  reasons  are given  for trade  restrictions, 
such  as maintaining  domestic  production  at high  levels  in certain  sectors  for 
national  defense  purposes,  protecting  the safety and health of domestic 
consumers  and the environment,  and generally  controlling  the flows of 
individual  products.  Bhagwati  has shown  that whenever  the government  is 
determined  to achieve  a social goal, the optimal  strategy  is to use policy 
variables  that affect  the target  variable  most directly.20  For example,  trade 
restriction  through  a tariff  or quota  is inefficient  since  it is equivalent  to the 
simultaneous  introduction  of a production  subsidy  and a consumption  tax. 
Trade  restrictions,  therefore,  would  be optimal  only  where  these  two things 
are  desirable  simultaneously  and,  by coincidence,  are  desirable  at the same 
ad valorem  rate. Even apart  from this bizarre  case, it is difficult  to con- 
struct  cases  in which  society  wishes  both to tax consumption  and to stim- 
ulate  production  of a given  product. 
In the case of the infant  industry  that  the country  wishes  to encourage,  a 
production  subsidy  is demonstrably  superior  to a tariff  in that it does not 
artificially  raise  the price  to consumers.  At times,  the most efficient  use of 
government  resources  would be to affect  directly  the country's  factor  en- 
dowment.  In short,  if the social goal is to reduce  consumption  of a given 
product,  a consumption  tax is superior  to tariffs;  if it is to stimulate  pro- 
duction,  a production  subsidy  is superior  to the tariff. 
In summary,  each of the six objectives  of trade  restrictions  could  poten- 
tially  be achieved  more  efficiently  through  other  policy  tools. Although  the 
arguments  for  trade  restrictions  are  economically  weak,  the  political  reasons 
for their  existence  are  more  persuasive.  First,  import-competing  industries 
(see David B. Humphrey,  "Demand  Inflation  and Effective  Protection,"  Southern  Eco- 
nomic  Journal,  Vol. 37, October  1970,  pp. 144-50).  The effective  rate  of protection  is mea- 
sured  as the ad valorem  tariff on the final product  less the tariff on the material  inputs 
into the product weighted by their importance;  both terms are then adjusted  for the 
importance  of all material  inputs into the final product.  The general  tendency  of coun- 
tries to place higher  tariffs  on manufactures  of finished  goods as opposed to raw mate- 
rials is reflected  in recent data published  by GATT. See The Contracting  Parties  to the 
General  Agreement  on Tariffs  and Trade,  Basic  Documentation  of Tariff  Study,  Summary 
Tables  (Geneva:  The Contracting  Parties,  July 1970).  The GATT study shows that the 
average  ad valorem  tariff  rates  in the major  industrial  countries  (calculated  by weighting 
each country's  tariffs  by its trade)  is 6.2 percent  for raw materials,  9.0 percent  for semi- 
manufactures,  and 10.4 percent  for finished  manufactures. 
20. For the most comprehensive  survey  of the optimal policy tools to use in a given 
situation, see Jagdish  N. Bhagwati,  "The Generalized  Theory of Distortions and Wel- 
fare,"  in Jagdish  N. Bhagwati  and others  (eds.), Trade,  Balance  of Payments  and  Growth: 
Papers in International  Economics  in Honor of Charles  P. Kindleberger  (Amsterdam: 
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prefer  them  to the more direct  form because  of the anonymity  and lower 
visibility  of subsidization  they provide.  Second,  trade  restrictions  are po- 
litically  attractive  since  they simultaneously  generate  government  revenue, 
subsidize  producer  interests  that are well-organized  politically,  and tax 
consumer  interests  that, until lately, have not been effectively  organized. 
Third,  the optimum  tariff argument  may be in the back of politicians' 
minds  when  a tariff  is levied:  They  hope that foreigners  and not domestic 
residents  will bear  the "incidence"  of the tax. 
It is reassuring  that substitutability  within  the economic  system  provides 
some  offset  to the welfare  losses  imposed  by trade  restrictions.  Mundell  has 
shown that even if international  commodity  movements  are completely 
stopped  by tariffs  or quotas,  a small  country  may avoid  any  loss of welfare 
if there  is free  movement  of at least one factor  of production.21 Thus,  even 
if protectionists  in the United  States  succeeded  in stopping  all international 
trade,  under  some fairly  restrictive  assumptions,  U.S. residents  might  still 
be able to attain  the free  trade  welfare  level if (contrary  to fact) either  (1) 
free immigration  or (2) free movements  of capital  were  permitted.  Thus, 
some  of the welfare  losses  imposed  by trade  restrictions  may  be undone  by 
factor  mobility. 
Given  these  arguments  on both sides  of the tariff  question,  what  has  been 
the historical  pattern  of tariff  levels  in the United States?  Figure 1 shows 
that from  early  in the century  until  the early  twenties,  tariff  rates  were  fall- 
ing. The rates  rose in the 1920s  with the Fordney-McCumber  tariff and 
again  in the 1930s  under  Smoot-Hawley.  Since  then,  there  has been  a grad- 
ual movement  to freer  trade. 
The Welfare  Effects  of Moving  to Free  Trade 
A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING  THE WELFARE EFFECTS 
As noted at the outset,  international  trade  confers  on a country  two ad- 
vantages,  both of which  increase  its real income:  (1) an expansion  of its 
consumption  opportunities,  and (2) a shift of its resources  into more  pro- 
ductive  areas.  One way of quantifying  these gains is through  consumers' 
surplus  and producers'  surplus,  as illustrated  in Figure  2. The panel on 
consumers'  surplus  reveals  that,  if the product  were  sold on a unit-by-unit 
21. Robert A.  Mundell, "International  Trade and Factor Mobility," American 
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Figure  2. Measurement  of Consumers'  and  Producers'  Surpluses 
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basis,  and  the price  exceeded  OM,  no units  would  be sold. If one unit  were 
sold, someone  would  be willing  to pay ss1; the second  unit could be sold 
for ttl, the third  unit for uul, and so on. If the price  is OP",  the amount 
people  would  be willing  to pay on a unit-by-unit  basis  is equal  to the area 
OQQeRM.  However,  since  everyone  pays the same  price  for each  unit sold, 
the actual  payment  for O  Qe  is equal  to the area OQeRP,,  or area A2. The 
residual  region,  A1, is called  the "consumers'  surplus."  As the price  falls, 
this area  becomes  larger,  and  consumers  are  better  off. The  concept  of pro- 
ducers'  surplus  is similar.  At a market  price  below ON, suppliers  are not 
willing  to provide  any output.  If the price  is equal  to ii1, one unit  would  be 
forthcoming,  a second  if the price  were  raised  tojjl, and  so forth.  Thus,  on 
a unit-by-unit  basis, suppliers  would be willing  to supply  OQe  if they re- 
ceived  area  B2 as their  total receipts.  However,  if OPe  is the market  price, 
the actual  receipts  of suppliers  equal  the areas  B1 +  B2. Thus, producers 
receive  a "producers'  surplus"  equal to area  B1. This partial  equilibrium 
approach  can be extended  to a general  equilibrium  context in the two- 
sector  model  by using  compensated  demand  curves  and  general  equilibrium 
supply  curves  (that is, the vertical  axis expresses  a price  ratio). 
The  use of consumers'  surplus  and  producers'  surplus  as measures  of the 
welfare  costs of trade  restrictions  is illustrated  in Figure  3.22  Assume  that 
the United States is importing  a product  whose world price is equal to 
OP,  The U.S. domestic  demand  and supply  curves  for the product are 
shown  in the figure.  With  no restrictions  on U.S. imports,  domestic  demand 
would equal OQ2,  with OQ2  produced  by U.S. producers  and  Q2Q2  the 
quantity  imported.  The consumers'  surplus  would then be the triangular 
area  MSPW  and  the producers'  surplus  would  be area  H1. If a tariff  is now 
imposed  on imports  of the product  but the world  price  stays  fixed,  the U.S. 
price  rises  to OP.. The ad valorem  tariff  is equal to the ratio of PIj,,  to 
22. One analytical  problem with these welfare measures  is that the imports under 
consideration  include both consumer goods and intermediate  goods while the tradi- 
tional theory deals only with consumer goods. However, Richard Schmalensee,  in 
"Consumer's  Surplus and Producer's  Goods," American  Economic  Review, Vol. 61 
(September  1971), pp. 682-87, finds that in the constant costs-perfectly  competitive 
case, if the ratio between  intermediate  and final  goods is fixed,  the traditional  consumers' 
surplus  approach  yields an accurate  measure  of the social welfare  effects. If the ratio is 
not fixed,  so that the lower  price  caused  by a tariff  decrease  causes  the ratio  to change,  the 
traditional  measure  overstates  the true welfare  gain in the competitive  case and under- 
states  the social  gain  in the monopoly  case. Since  import  markets  probably  fall somewhere 
between  the perfectly  competitive  and the monopoly cases, there is no reason to expect 
the estimate  here to be too high or too low because  of the intermediate  goods problem. 
The one caveat is that Schmalensee  deals only with the constant  costs case. Stephen P. Magee  659 
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OP..  Notice that the amount  of consumer  surplus  is reduced  by the area 
PwSRPu8.  What  happens  to this decrease  in the value of consumer  welfare? 
First, the trapezoidal  area  I is transferred  to producers'  surplus,  so that 
import-competing  producers  earn  windfall  gains.  Second,  area  E becomes 
tariff revenue and is transferred  from consumers  of import-competing 
products  to the government  (area  E equals  the tariff  rate P.oP.8  times the 
quantity  of imports  Qi  Q' under  the tariff).  Thus,  two of the main  compo- 
nents  of the reduction  in the welfare  of consumers  are simply  a transfer  to 
other U.S. citizens:  I is the redistribution  effect  to producers  and E the 660  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 3:1972 
revenue  effect.  However,  two portions  of the reduction  in consumers'  sur- 
plus are captured  by no one. These are the triangular  areas D1 and D2, 
and they are known  as the "deadweight  losses"  caused  by the tariff.  Area 
D1 corresponds  to the production  deadweight  loss, which  results  from  an 
artificial  movement  of resources  from higher-  to lower-productivity  pur- 
suits;  and D2 is the consumption  deadweight  loss, which  reflects  substitu- 
tion of less satisfactory  products  by consumers.  The subsequent  investiga- 
tion concentrates  on areas  D1 and  D2, the sum  of which  measures  the total 
social costs to U.S. consumers  of U.S. trade  restrictions.23 
The deadweight  loss triangles  in Figure  3 are  annualflows,  that is, these 
losses are incurred  every  year. In analyzing  the welfare  effects  of moving 
toward  free  trade,  the gains  through  the reduction  in the inefficiencies  (D1 
and D2) must  be adjusted  for the costs of moving  resources  from  import- 
competing  industries  into other  areas.  This  involves  calculating  the present 
discounted  value  of both the perpetual  annual  deadweight  losses  of welfare 
and  the costs  of moving  resources  out of import-competing  production  and 
into other  areas.24  The initial  assumption  is that neither  the demand  nor 
the supply  of the product  in question  is growing;  this assumption  is later 
relaxed.  The long-run  supply  elasticity  will, however,  exceed  the short-run 
supply  elasticity.  Thus,  the  production  deadweight  loss, D1,  becomes  larger 
23. See W. M. Corden, "The Calculation of the Cost of Protection,"  Economic 
Record,  Vol. 33 (April 1957),  pp. 29-51; Basevi,  "Restrictive  Effect of the U.S. Tariff"; 
Stern,  "U.S. Tariff and the Efficiency  of the U.S. Economy"; and Franklin  V. Walker, 
"The Restrictive  Effect  of the U.S. Tariff:  Comment,"  American  Econlomic  Review,  Vol. 
59 (December  1969), pp. 963-66. The use of these triangles  as measures  of the welfare 
costs of trade  restrictions  has been discussed  extensively  by Johnson  in "Cost of Protec- 
tion and the Scientific  Tariff."  The theoretical  underpinnings  of these measures  of wel- 
fare have been discussed  extensively  in Arnold C. Harberger's  work; see, for example, 
"The Measurement  of Waste,"  in American  Economic  Association,  Papers  ...  1963,  pp. 
58-76. The rather  strong  assumptions  necessary  for the use of this technique  and all of its 
theoretical  difficulties  will not be discussed  here.  The discussions  by Dale W. Jorgenson, 
William  Vickrey,  Tjalling  C. Koopmans, and Paul A. Samuelson,  in response  to Har- 
berger's  paper  and appearing  in the same  Papers  (pp. 86-96), refer  to a number  of these 
difficulties. 
One set of sufficient  conditions for consistent additivity of individual preference 
maps into community  preference  maps is that all individuals  have identical  and homo- 
thetic preferences.  The measures  used here  also imply  that the marginal  utility of income 
is the same across  individuals  and at all income levels. 
24. For intertemporal  approaches  to deadweight  losses, see D. Levhari  and E. She- 
shinski, "Lifetime Excess Burden of a Tax," Journal of Political Economy, Vol.  80 
(January/February  1972), pp. 139-47, and Baldwin and Mutti, "Policy Problems." 
I am especially  indebted  to the Baldwin  and Mutti  paper  for suggesting  the discounting  of 
both benefits  and adjustment  costs. Stephen  P. Magee  661 
through  time.  In Figure  3, this means  that the point L, which  is the inter- 
section  of the supply  curve  and the world  price  line, will move to the left 
as the supply  curve  rotates  through  T and adjusts  to its long-run  position. 
For most consumer  products,  the long-run  demand  elasticity  will exceed 
the short-run  demand  elasticity.25  Thus,  the long-run  consumption  dead- 
weight  loss, D2, will be larger  than the short-run  deadweight  loss. The 
sizes of the two deadweight  loss flows increase  until the new long-run 
equilibrium  is reached,  and thereafter  the two triangles  remain  at a con- 
stant  size in the absence  of growth.  Since  the losses are changing  through 
time,  discounting  them  is instructive  since  it reduces  the changing  flows  to 
a single  present  value;  thus, the costs of tariffs  can be compared  with the 
present  values  of alternative  policies. 
The welfare  gains  from  tariff  elimination  must  be adjusted  for the costs 
of moving factors from the import-competing  sector into other areas. 
The largest  component  of this cost is the unemployment  of factors  of pro- 
duction  during  a transition  period  from  the time the factors  leave  the im- 
port-competing  industry  until they are reemployed.  These costs are in- 
curred  only until a new long-run  supply  equilibrium  is achieved;  at that 
point  resource  flows  cease  and  hence  no further  costs arise  from the move- 
ment  of resources.  In this  paper,  the relocation  costs  of labor  will  be used  as 
a proxy  for the general  costs of relocation.  There  are serious  difficulties  in 
calculating  the costs of moving capital that is quasi-specific  to import- 
competing  production.  As a result,  the "lost  labor  time"  measure  will un- 
derstate  the total social cost of the resource  movement,  just as the dead- 
weight  loss triangles  understate  the costs of trade  restrictions  (some of the 
nonquantifiable  losses are discussed  below). 
COSTS OF EXISTING  RESTRICTIONS  ON U.S.  IMPORTS 
What  are  the annual  costs of existing  restrictions  on U.S. trade?  This  sec- 
tion analyzes  the impact  on U.S. imports,  considered  in three  categories: 
those  that compete  directly  with  U.S. production  and are  subject  to tariffs; 
25. However,  H. S. Houthakker  and Lester  D. Taylor, in Consumer  Demand  in the 
United  States, 1929-1970: Analyses  and Projections  (2d ed., Harvard  University  Press, 
1970), show that in cases where  inventory  adjustments  are present,  the long-run  demand 
elasticity  for products  can be less than the short-run  elasticity.  But on balance  they find 
that the "habit  formation"  phenomenon  generally  dominates  the "inventory  adjustment" 
phenomenon,  so that the long-run  demand  elasticities  exceed  the short-run  elasticities. 
I assume  that producers  and consumers  are in long-run  equilibrium  at points T and 
R in Figure 3, so that the supply and demand  curves  rotate through  these points. 662  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 3:1972 
Table  2. Value  of U.S. Imports  and  Duties  Paid  on Major  Products  Subject 
to Quantitative  Restrictions,  1971 
Millions of dollars 
Product  Imports  Duties 
Petroleum  3,278  100 
Steela  2,009  126 
Man-made  and woolen textiles  1,840  ... 
Sugar  813  48 
Meat  598  34 
Cotton textiles  590 
Dairy  70  .. 
Stainless  steel flatware  28  ... 
Cotton and cotton waste  8  ... 
Wheat  0.4  ... 
Peanuts  0.4  ... 
Total  9,235  308 
Sources: All data except for steel were supplied by Mary Jane Wignot, Office  of the Special Representative 
for Trade Negotiations. Steel data, which are from the Trade Relations Council of the United States, Inc., 
are for 1969 and are for standard industrial classification (SIC) 3312 only (blast furnaces and steel mills). 
James Ozzello, U.S. Department of State, Trade Agreements Division, has noted that SIC categories 3315, 
3316, and 3317 (steel wiredrawing,  cold finishing of steel shapes, and steel pipe and tube, respectively)  are 
also included in the voluntary agreement, but data problems excluded them from this exercise. SIC 3312 is 
the largest of the four categories. 
a.  1969 data. 
those that compete  only partially,  both dutiable  and otherwise;  and those 
subject  to quotas  or government-to-government  agreements.  I assume  that 
decreases  in the respective  tariffs  lead to equal  reductions  in the prices  of 
competing  U.S. goods in the first  group,  but not in the second. 
Table  2 shows  major  import  items  subject  to quotas  or other  quantitative 
restrictions,  which  in 1971  accounted  for $9.2 billion  in U.S. imports.  The 
remaining  task  is to divide  the $36.4  billion  in nonquota  imports  into those 
that are directly  competitive  and those that compete  only partially  with 
domestic  production.  The only information  readily  available  on imports 
that compete  closely with domestic  production  has been provided  by the 
U.S. Bureau  of Labor  Statistics.62  Since  I rely on these  data, which  cover 
only manufactured  imports,  costs of the tariff  on directly  competitive  non- 
manufactured  imports  will be understated.  As the data shown  in Table 3 
26. U.S. Bureau  of Labor Statistics,  "Productivity  and Unit Labor Costs in Export 
and Import-Competing  Industries,  1958-68," in  United  States International  Economic 
Policy in an Interdependent  World,  Papers  Submitted  to the Commission  on International 
Trade and Investment  Policy (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971), Vol. 1, pp. 
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Table 3.  Calculation  of Competitive  U.S. Imports  and  Duties for 1971 from 
1969 Data 
Dollar amounts  in millions 
Percent 
Line  Description  Amount  of total 
1969 
1  Total imports  (c.i.f.)  $38,314  100.0% 
2  Manufactured  33,115  ... 
3  Directly  competitive  with U.S. productions  10,281  26.8 
4  Import-competing  production  in United States  41,500  ... 
5  Customs  duties  2,340  100.0 
6  On directly  competitive  imports5  814  34.8 
7  On remainder  of imports  1,526  65.2 
1971 
8  Total imports (f.o.b.)  45,602  100.0 
9  Directly  competitive  with U.S. productions  12,220  26.8 
10  Quota items  9,235  20.3 
11  Other  24,147  53.0 
12  Import-competing  production  in United States  44,862  ... 
13  Customs  duties  2,768  100.0 
14  On directly  competitive  imports"  963  34.8 
15  On quota items  308  11.1 
16  On other  imports  1,497  54.1 
Sources: Line 1-International  Monetary Fund, International  Financial Statistics, Vol. 25 (June 1972), 
p. 37. 
Line 2-Trade  Relations Council of the United States, Inc., Employment,  Output, and Foreign Trade of 
U.S. Manufacturing  Industries, 1958-69/70 (4th ed.; Washington: TRC, 1972), Vol. 2, p. 793. 
Lines 3, 4-Derived  by applying data in ibid., Vols. 1 and 2, to four-digit standard industrial classification 
industries in which imports have very close domestic substitutes, using classification from U.S. Bureau of 
Labor Statistics, "Productivity and Unit Labor Costs in Export and Import-Competing Industries, 1958- 
68," in United States international  Economic  Policy in an Interdependent World, Papers Submitted to the 
Commission on International Trade and Investment Policy (U.S. Government Printing Office, July 1971), 
Vol. 1, App. A. 
Line 5-U.S.  Tariff Commission, tabulation, "Value of U.S. Imports for Consumption, Duties Collected, 
and Ratio of Duties to Values, under the Tariff Act of 1930, 1930-71" (March 1972; processed). 
Lines 6, 7-Same  as Lines 3, 4. 
Line 8-International  Financial Statistics, Vol. 25 (October 1972), p. 366. Note  that the data are on an 
f.o.b. basis. 
Line 9-26.8  percent (from line 3) of line 8. 
Lines 10-Table  2. 
Line 12-Since  data were not yet available on U.S.  production competing directly with imports. it is 
assumed to grow at the same rate as total goods output in the United States. The Economic Report of the 
President,  January 1972, p. 200, reports that output of total goods increased from $457.3 billion in 1969 to 
$494.2 billion in 1971, or an increase of 8.1 percent. Thus line 12 equals 1.081 tinmes  line 4. 
Line 13-Same  as line 5. 
Line 14-34.8  percent (from line 6) of line 13. 
Line 15-Table  2. 
Lines 11, 16-Residuals. 
Calculations are based on data before rounding. 
a.  Directly competitive means those manufactured imports that are dutiable and not subject to quotas, 
and that compete closely with U.S. production. 664  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 3:1972 
indicate,  directly  competitive  imports  in 1971  were  calculated  to be $12.2 
billion and to compete  with $44.9 billion in U.S. production.  Other  im- 
ports  equaled  $24.1 billion.  Thus, quota items  are 20 percent  of total im- 
ports,  directly  competitive  imports  are  27 percent,  and  the remainder  equals 
53 percent. 
According  to the allocation  of customs  revenue  collected  in 1971,  shown 
in Table 3, the implied  ad valorem  tariff  rate on all U.S. imports  was 6.1 
percent:  On quota  items  it was  3.3 percent;  on directly  competitive  imports, 
7.9 percent;  and on other  imports,  6.2 percent. 
DIRECTLY  COMPETITIVE  U.S.  IMPORTS 
In order  to calculate  the welfare  effects  of the existing  tariff  structure, 
values  must  be assigned  to the elasticities  of domestic  demand,  supply,  and 
imports.  In Figure  3, these correspond  to the elasticities  of the domestic 
demand  and supply  curves  in the region  of points  T for production  and R 
for consumption.  However,  equation  (1) implies  that  only  two of these  three 
elasticities  are  independent  in the case of imports  that are  perfectly  substi- 
tutable  with domestic  production: 
(1)  em =  (ed  -  e8)  +  e, 
where 
em =  the elasticity of demand for imports 
ed  =  the domestic  demand  elasticity 
e8 =  the domestic supply elasticity 
D = the total quantity  demanded  in the United States  (the sum of do- 
mestic  production  plus imports) 
M = the quantity  of imports  consumed. 
From Table 3 the ratio of D to M equals  (12.2 +  44.9)/12.2, or 4.67,27 
assuming  a domestic  price of unity. Since more econometric  evidence  is 
available  on import  price  elasticities  than on the relevant  domestic  supply 
and  demand  elasticities,  I have  assumed  a value  for  em  and  derived  values  of 
ed and  e8  that  satisfy  equation  (1). The  import  elasticity,  em,  is assumed  to be 
27. For simplicity,  in this and similar  calculations  in this paper,  the rounded  numbers 
are given, although  the calculations  are made from unrounded  data. Stephen  P. Magee  665 
-3  in the short  run  and -8  in the  long run.28  The short-run  elasticity  con- 
strains e8 to 0.82 if  ed  =  0, and ed  to-0.64  if e8 =  0. There is evidence 
that  the supply  elasticities  exceed  the demand  elasticities  (in absolute  value) 
in both the short  and the long run.29  I assume  that the demand  elasticities 
equal  minus  one-half  the supply  elasticities.  These  assumptions,  with  equa- 
tion (1), yield the following pattern of  domestic demand and supply 
elasticities: 
Elasticity  Short  run  Long  run 
Domestic  demand,  ed  -0.25  -0.75 
Domestic  supply,  e8  0.50  1.50 
These  elasticities  seem  low and will mean some underestimate  of the wel- 
fare  costs of U.S. tariffs.  For example,  on the supply  side in the long run, 
constant  costs  may  be a reasonable  assumption,  implying  that  the long-run 
elasticity  of supply  would  be infinite.30  But assuming  higher  domestic  de- 
mand and supply  elasticities  would produce  an implausibly  high import 
price  elasticity.  For simplicity,  the discussion  in this section  assumes  that 
elimination  of tariffs  on U.S. imports  does not raise the world price of 
U.S. importables.  Thus  the understatement  of the welfare  costs using  low 
domestic  elasticities  is more or less offset by ignoring  the terms-of-trade 
effect  on importables.31 
28. The short-run  elasticities  are consistent  with those found in H. S. Houthakker 
and Stephen P. Magee, "Income and Price Elasticities in World Trade," Review Of 
Economics  and  Statistics,  Vol. 51 (May 1969),  pp. 111-25, while  both are somewhat  higher 
than those in John E. Floyd, "The Overvaluation  of the Dollar: A Note on the Inter- 
national Price Mechanism,"  American  Economic  Review, Vol. 55 (March 1965), pp. 
95-107. 
29. For example, J. Wemelsfelder,  in "The Short-Term  Effect of the Lowering of 
Import Duties in Germany,"  Economic  Journal, Vol. 70  (March 1960), pp. 94-104, 
found that cuts in West German tariffs in the late 1950s stimulated  imports primarily 
through  contraction  of production  rather  than through  increases  in consumption. 
30. See Harry  G. Johnson,  "Factor  Market  Distortions  and the Shape of the Trans- 
formation  Curve,"  Econometrica,  Vol. 34 (July 1966), pp. 686-98. Johnson performed 
simulations on the degree of curvature  of the production  possibility curve and found 
that an economy's  ability  to transform  one product  into another  is extremely  high, even 
under fairly large variations in the parameters  of  the production functions. A.  A. 
Walters,  in "Production  and Cost Functions; an Econometric  Survey,"  Econometrica, 
Vol. 31 (January-April  1963),  pp. 1-66, also finds  that the evidence  for constant  returns 
to scale is very strong.  Thus, the assumption  of a long-run  supply  elasticity  of 1.5 is too 
low. The domestic demand elasticities here are also somewhat  lower than those esti- 
mated by Houthakker  and Taylor, Consumer  Demand,  p. 175. 
31. Both estimated  and assumed  values of the foreign supply elasticity  for U.S. im- 
ports are high enough in the short run to make this a fairly  innocuous assumption.  In 666  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity. 3:1972 
Table  4. Short-run  and  Long-run  Static  Effects,  from  1971  Base,  of 
Elimination  of Tariffs  on U.S. Imports  with  Close  Domestic  Substitutes 
Millions of dollars  in annual  flows 
Change  in variable 
due to price chanige 
Short  Long  Analogous 
Variable  and  formula  run  run  area in Figure  3 
Deadweight  loss (D WL)  elimination  97  291  D = D1 +  D2 
Consumption,  0.5t2Ded  38  114  D2 
Production,  -0.5t2Se8  59  177  D 
Decrease  in domestic  production,  -tS(1  +  es)  4,912  8,187  1 +  D1 +  G 
Redistribution:  consumer  gain  4,275  4,350  I +  D +  E 
Producers'  loss, tS(1 -  0.5te8)  3,215  3,096  1 
Revenue  and DWL to consumers,  1,060  1,254  D +  E 
0.5t2(-Ded  +  Se,)  +  t(D  -  S) 
Increased  value  of imports  2,680  8,040  G1 +  G2 
Increased  consumption,  tDed  1 042  3,126  G2 
Reduced  production,  tSe8  1,638  4,914  G 
Revenue  loss, t(D -  S)  963  963  E 
Sources: Derived from indicated formulas, where in the mathematical expressions 
t =  change in the U.S. price if the quota were eliminated (the ad valorem tariff is 7.9 percent, from text; 
thus  t  =  0.079/1.079  =  0.073) 
D  ='total  demand in the United  States (domestic production plus imports) =  $57,082 million (from 
Table 3) (note that the D in Figure 3 referred  to in the last column stands for deadweight  loss, and not 
total demand.) 
S  = total supply in the United States =  $44,862 million (from Table 3) 
ei  =  domestic demand elasticity (short run =  -0.25;  long run =  -0.75)  (from text) 
e, = domestic supply elasticity (short run = 0.5; long run =  1.50) (from text) 
The calculations were made from data before rounding. 
a.  The t in this formula differs  from the others in the table; it refers to the actual ad valorem  tariff  rate (7.9 
percent), while they refer to the percentage decrease in price (7.3 percent). 
The  formulas  for  calculating  the welfare  and  structural  effects  of reducing 
the 7.9 percent  ad valorem  tariff  on directly  competitive  imports  to zero  are 
shown  in Table  4, and  described  more  fully  in Johnson's  paper.32  The  table 
gives the short- and long-run  effects  of the tariff  elimination;  these data 
are shown  geometrically  in Figure  3, although  strictly  speaking,  the func- 
tions should  be constant  elasticity  nonlinear  curves  in the relevant  regions 
rather  than the linear  functions  of that figure. 
Table 4 indicates  that the deadweight  loss attributable  to the current 
tariff  system  equals  $97 million  a year  in the short  run and $291  million  a 
the long run, a foreign  supply  elasticity  of infinity  is plausible  so that the adverse  effect 
on U.S. welfare  of a rise in world prices when U.S. tariffs are cut is only a short-run 
phenomenon. 
32. Johnson, "Costs of Protection." Stephen  P. Magee  667 
year  in the long run.  Most of this distortion  is due to misallocation  of pro- 
duction. These numbers  are underestimates  of the social cost of these 
tariffs,  since  tariff  rates  vary  around  the mean  of 7.9 percent,  and the wel- 
fare loss triangles  grow through  time; however,  they are overestimates 
in the short  run  because  I have ignored  the cost of labor  movements.  Ad- 
justments  for all three  of these factors  will be performed  in a subsequent 
section.  Tariff  elimination  reduces  the value  of domestic  production  by ap- 
proximately  $5 billion in the short run and $8 billion in the long run, 
assuming  the simple  static case of no growth.  Elimination  benefits  con- 
sumers  of import-competing  products  by $4.3 billion, both in the short 
and in the long run.  Most of this is at the expense  of producers  of import- 
competing  production.  The value of imports  increases  by $2.7 billion a 
year  in the short  run  and $8.0  billion  a year  in the  long run,  mostly  through 
reduced  U.S. production  rather  than increased  U.S. consumption.  Nearly 
$1 billion  in tariff  revenue  is eliminated,  in both the short  and  the  long run. 
OTHER  U.S.  IMPORTS 
To assess  the effects  of eliminating  the 6.2 percent  tariff  on U.S. imports 
that are  not directly  competitive  with  U.S. production,  and not subject  to 
quotas,  the analysis  assumes  an elasticity  of import  demand  of -2  in the 
short  run  and  of -5  in the long run.  With  these  elasticities,  the estimate  of 
the deadweight  losses (DWLs)  attributable  to the tariff  is 
(2)  DWL  =  0.5t2emV 
DWLsr =  0.5 (0.058)2 (2.0) (24,100) 
=  $81 million 
DWLL,  =  0.5 (0.058)2 (5.0) (24,100) 
=  $202 million, 
where  V is the value  of imports  before  the tariff  cut. The  gain  to the United 
States  from eliminating  this tariff  is $81 million  per year  in the short  run 
and $202  million  per  year  in the long run.  Elimination  of this tariff  results 
in a 5.8 percent  drop  in the price  of imported  goods; t = (0.062/1.062)  = 
0.058.  Assuming  that  this  reduces  the price  domestically  by 1 percent,33  and 
that domestic  supply  elasticities  are 1.0 in the short  run  and 3.0 in the long 
33. Use of different  import  price  changes  and domestic  prices  changes  follows Floyd's 
technique  of handling  imports  that are imperfectly  substitutable  with domestic produc- 
tion (see "Overvaluation  of the Dollar"). 668  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 3:1972 
Figure 4.  Long-run  Static Effects, from 1971 Base, of Tariff Elimination  on 
Noncompetitive  U.S.  Imports 
Price 
PUS  ~~~R 
P.  _  q  -  -  Supply  of imports 
M'  Demand|for  Liports 
0  Qi  Qo  Quianitity  imnported 
Value 
(billions  of dollars 
Areaa  in annualflows)  Definition 
it  1.5  Revenue redistributed  to consumers 
M'  24.1  Old value of imports 
L'  7.0  Increase  in value of imports 
K'  0.2  Deadweight  loss 
Source: Derived by method discussed in text. 
a.  Not drawn to scale. 
run,  domestic  production  declines  by $4.4 billion  and $8.7 billion,  respec- 
tively. The redistribution  from producers  to consumers  is roughly $2.2 
billion  in the short  run and $2.0 billion  in the long run.34  This redistribu- 
tion, plus the revenue  and deadweight  loss effects,  increases  the welfare  of 
consumers  of these  importable  products  by $3.8  billion  in the short  run  and 
by $3.7 billion in the long run. The changes  in trade  in the long run are 
shown  in Figure  4. The curves  are  the U.S. import  demand  curve  and the 
foreign  supply  curve  of goods to the United States.  Domestic  production 
and  consumption  are  not shown  in Figure  4. Area  K' is the deadweight  loss 
of the tariff. 
34. The domestic  production  data for this exercise  are based on an estimate  of $217 
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U.S.  IMPORTS UNDER  QUOTAS 
This section considers  the welfare costs associated  with quantitative 
limitations  on six major  products  imported  into the  United  States.  Imports 
of these  goods  equaled  $9.2  billion  in 1971  (see  Table  2). Table  5 shows  the 
values  of domestic  supply  and  demand  and  imports  for the six major  quota 
items  in 1969.  The  last column  will be combined  with  equation  (1) in some 
cases  to approximate  the import  price  elasticities  of demand. 
I shall  rely  in this  section  on other  studies  of U.S. import  quotas.  In some 
cases  these  estimate  only the consumer  cost. This  exceeds  the social  cost to 
the United States, however,  since part of it is a redistribution  to U.S. 
import-competing  producers  and part of the "tariff-equivalent  revenue" 
is captured  by U.S. importers.  The actual  social cost to the United States 
equals  the deadweight  losses  plus that  part  of the tariff-equivalent  revenue 
that is captured  by foreign  suppliers.  The latter  portion  reflects  the possi- 
bility  that quotas  may  allow  foreign  suppliers  licensed  to sell in the United 
States to charge  more than the world price. The quota operates  like a 
tariff, but the "revenue"  is shared  by importers  and foreign exporters 
rather  than flowing  into the U.S. Treasury.  Figure  4 can be used to illus- 
Table  5. U.S. Domestic  Supply,  Demand,  and  Imports  of Major  Products 
Subject  to Quotas,  1969 
Dollar amounts  in millions 
Domestic  Ratio of 
supply  less  Domestic  demand  to 
Product  exports  Imports  demand  imports 
Petroleum  $12,460  $2,480  $14,940  6.02 
Steel  24,300  2,009  26,310  13.10 
Textiles,  total  17,597  1,632  19,229  11.78 
Man-made  12,418  695  13,113  ... 
Woolen  1,203  410  1,613  ... 
Cotton  3,976  527  4,503  ... 
Sugar  2,420  677  3,097  4.57 
Meat  9,523  558  10,081  18.07 
Dairy  10,817  100  10,917  109.17 
All quota items  77,117  7,456  84,574  11.34 
Source: All data except those for steel and textiles were supplied by Mary Jane Wignot, Office of the 
Special Representative  for Trade Negotiations. The textile data were provided by Emanuel Lipscomb of the 
U.S. Department of Commerce. The steel data are from the Trade Relations Council of the United States, 
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trate  these  points.  If, instead  of the tariff,  a quota  had been  used  to cut im- 
ports from OQO  to OQi, then the quota  would  have been equivalent  to a 
tariff equal to PUSPW/OPw  in that it  cut trade by an equivalent amount.35 
The tariff-equivalent  revenue  is equal  to area  J'. Since there  is a gap be- 
tween internal  U.S. prices and world prices, this area will be captured 
either  by U.S. importers  or foreign  suppliers,  or partly  by each,  depending 
on the competitive  situation  in the import  market.  If it is captured  entirely 
by U.S. importers,  the social  cost of the quota  to the United States  equals 
the deadweight  loss triangle,  K'. If it is captured  entirely  by foreign  sup- 
pliers,  the cost to the United  States  equals  K' +  J'. In the third  case,  where 
the revenue  is shared,  the cost is K' + fJ'; f  is the fraction  of the tariff- 
equivalent  revenue  captured  by foreigners.  The first two situations  are 
simply  special  cases of the third in which  f  = 0 and f  =  1, respectively. 
Another  point is that  the observed  value  of U.S. imports,  M, will be equal 
to the area  M' + fJ'. 
In order  to convert  the published  numbers  on the consumer  cost of 
quotas  into the social  costs,  I have  used  the following  procedure.  As above, 
t is the change  in the U.S. price if the quota were eliminated;  the price 
change  can be approximated  as 
(3)  t =  CS/D, 
where  CS is the consumer  surplus  lost due to the quota  and D the value  of 
demand  (or consumption),  inclusive  of CS.36 Variable  t is then  used  in the 
formulas  in Table  4 to calculate  the deadweight  losses. 
Calculation  of the portion  of the tariff-equivalent  revenue  going  to for- 
eigners  involves  the following  variables:  M' is the value  of imports  exclu- 
sive of the tariff  revenue  they capture,  ftM' is the tariff  revenue  they cap- 
ture, and the sum of these two items equals  observed  imports,  M: 
(4)  M =M'  + ftM'. 
Thus,  M' is computed  by 
(5)  M' = M/(1 + ft); 
35. Rachel McCulloch,  in "Import  Quotas  and Resource  Allocation"  (PhD. disserta- 
tion, University  of Chicago,  1973),  has defined  other  equivalences  in monopolistic  cases. 
36. This is an exact measure  if the domestic  demand  elasticity  equals zero. This cal- 
culation of t places no restriction  on the foreign supply elasticity of the good to the 
United States. It is already  implicit  in the estimates  given in the studies  surveyed. Stephen P. Magee  671 
and the tariff-equivalent  revenue  captured  by foreigners,  RF, in terms  of 
observed  imports,  M, is 
(6)  RF=(  ft)M. 
Equation  (6) will  be used  in estimating  the tariff-equivalent  revenue  lost to 
foreigners  under  the steel,  meat,  and  dairy  quotas. 
Petroleum.  Bergsten  notes that oil quotas raise the domestic  price of 
petroleum  by 60 percent.37  The Cabinet  Task  Force  on Oil Import  Control 
estimated  that  the cost to consumers  of the oil import  quota  was $5 billion 
and  would  increase  to $8 billion  per  year  by 1980,  involving  efficiency  costs 
of $1.5 billion  to $2.0 billion.38  Mintz,  in commenting  on the administra- 
tion of the oil quota, argues  that the loss of tariff-equivalent  revenue  to 
foreigners  may be small.39  Thus, the annual  social cost of the oil import 
quota  is assumed  here  to be $1.5 billion.  This number  is a bit high in the 
short  run,  but low in the long run. 
Steel. We consider  here only standard  industrial  classification  (SIC) 
3312, blast furnaces  and steel mills, although  SIC 3315, 3316, and 331740 
are also subject  to the voluntary  limitations.  According  to Mintz, in De- 
cember 1968, Japanese  and some European  steel industries,  which ac- 
counted  for 82  percent  of U.S. steel  imports,  agreed  to limit  their  exports  of 
steel  mill products  to the United States.  James  Ozzello41  estimates  that  the 
37. See C. Fred  Bergsten,  "The  Cost of Import  Restrictions  to American  Consumers" 
(American  Importers  Association,  no date; processed),  p. 3. 
38. Cabinet  Task Force on Oil Import  Control, The Oil Import  Question:  A Report 
on the Relationship  of Oil Imports  to the National  Security  (U.S. Government  Printing 
Office, 1970), p. 124. These long-run  efficiency  costs include only the production  dead- 
weight  loss; they  do not include  loss of tariff-equivalent  revenue  to foreigners  or the con- 
sumption deadweight  loss. See also the study by Kaj Areskoug, "U.S. Oil Import 
Quotas and National Income,"  Southern  Economic  Journal,  Vol. 37 (January  1971),  pp. 
307-17. 
39. Mintz, U.S. Import  Quotas. 
40. Steel wiredrawing,  cold finishing  of steel shapes,  and steel pipe and tube, respec- 
tively. 
41. The estimates  made by Ozzello,  who is in the Trade  Agreements'Division  of the 
U.S. Department  of State, incorporate  the quota, restrictive  government  procurement 
policies, and other nontariff  barriers.  His estimates  are not inconsistent  with those of 
C. R. MacPhee  in "Nontariff  Barriers  in International  Trade  in Steel" (Ph.D. disserta- 
tion, Michigan  State  University,  1970).  Restrictive  government  procurement  policies  are 
an important nontariff  barrier,  both here and abroad; for example, see Norman S. 
Fieleke, "The Buy-American  Policy of the United States Government:  Its Balance-of- 
Payments  and Welfare  Effects,"  New England  Economic  Review  (July/August  1969),  pp. 
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ad valorem  tariff  equivalent  of this and other  limitations  on U.S. imports 
of SIC 3312  is approximately  17 to 35 percent,  and that foreign  suppliers 
usually quote their prices to importers  at roughly 5 percent  below the 
U.S. price.  With 17 percent  taken  as a conservative  estimate  of the cost of 
the steel  limitations,  foreigners  capture  66 percent  of the tariff-equivalent 
revenue,  so thatf  = 0.66. Ozzello  also believes  that the world supply of 
steel  to the United States  is highly  elastic,  so that the fall in the U.S. price 
of steel with quota elimination would be t =  (0.17/1.17)  =  0.145. 
Equation  (2) can be used to calculate  the deadweight  loss effects  of the 
steel quota.  Table  5 and equation  (1) imply  that the import  price  elasticity 
of demand for steel should be high since DIM  =  13.1. If em  - 10,42 
the deadweight  loss is as follows: 
DWL =  0.5 (0.145)2 (10)(2009) 
=  $211 million. 
In addition  to this  loss, the  tariff-equivalent  revenue  captured  by foreigners, 
from equation  (6), is 
RF =  (O.66)(O.  145)  2009 
(1 +  0.66(0.145)) 
$175 million. 
Thus,  the total annual  cost to the United States  of the steel quota on SIC 
3312  is $386  million. 
Textiles.  At present,  there  are two sets of restrictions  on U.S. imports 
of textiles:  the  long-term  agreement  on cotton  textiles  (LTA)  and  the  volun- 
tary  agreements  with  Japan,  Taiwan,  Korea,  and  Hong Kong  to limit  their 
exports  of wool and man-made  textiles  to the United States.43  Because  of 
the nature  of these agreements,  most of the tariff-equivalent  revenue  is 
probably  captured  by foreigners.  Mintz  found  that the biggest  social cost 
would be in the area of woolen and man-made  textiles.  She hesitates  to 
place  a precise  national  cost on the textile  limitations  because  the data  are 
inadequate,  but takes $1.25  billion per year as a best guess  (roughly  half 
of her estimate  of the consumer  cost). She estimates  that this number  will 
double  between  1972  and 1976.  To be conservative,  I shall  use $1.25  billion 
in this exercise. 
42. This value equals the "high" value used in Baldwin and Mutti, "Policy Prob- 
lems," App. 1. 
43. See Mintz, U.S. Import  Quotas,  for a discussion  of the history  and the administra- 
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Sugar.  Mintz has calculated  the consumption  deadweight  loss of the 
sugar  quota  at $10  million  to $25  million  per  year  and  the production  dead- 
weight  loss at $79 million  to $110  million  per  year,  yielding  a total annual 
deadweight  loss of $89 million to $135 million. She estimates  the tariff- 
equivalent  revenue  paid  to foreigners  at $265  million  to $317  million.  Sum- 
ming the means of these ranges  gives an annual  average  loss due to the 
sugar  quota of $403  million. 
Meat and  dairy  products.  Bergsten  has noted  that the annual  consump- 
tion costs of the meat  import  quotas  is $350  million.44  From  equation  (3), 
the ad valorem  tariff  equivalent  is 3.5 percent,  and the price  decrease  with 
the elimination  of the quota is 3.38 percent.45  I assume  arbitrarily  that 
foreigners  capture  half the tariff-equivalent  revenue,  and that the price 
elasticity  of demand  for  meat  imports  is -10.  This  yields  a deadweight  loss 
of $3.2 million and tariff-equivalent  revenue  lost to foreigners  of $9.3 
million.  The total annual  social  cost is $12.5  million.46 
Bergsten  estimates  that approximately  $500  million  is paid annually  by 
consumers  of dairy  products  because  of the quota.47  From equation  (3), 
the tariff equivalent  is 4.6 percent,  implying  that t = 0.044. Assuming, 
arbitrarily,  that  the foreign  supply  is infinitely  elastic  and  that  the U.S. im- 
port price  elasticity  is -20  (see the large  number  for D/M in Table  5), the 
deadweight  loss is $1.9 million and the revenue  captured  by foreigners 
equals  $2.2 million,  or a total social  cost of $4.1 million  a year. 
Total  quotas.  The sum of the annual  long-run  costs to the United  States 
of the six quantitative  import limitations  considered  in this section is 
$3,555  million.  Assuming  that the textile  loss is equally  divided  between 
deadweight  loss and tariff-equivalent  revenue  lost to foreigners  implies 
that $2.4  billion  of the $3.6  billion  annual  cost of all quotas  is deadweight 
loss and $1.2 billion is tariff-equivalent  revenue  lost to foreigners.  While 
44. Bergsten,  "Cost of Restrictions,"  p. 4. 
45. Geoffrey  H. Jackson,  "The Impact  of Eliminating  the Quota on U.S. Imports  of 
Beef," Agricultural  Economics  Research  Paper  338 (Cornell  University,  Department  of 
Agricultural  Economics,  January  1972; processed),  estimates  that eliminating  the beef 
quota would result  in a 2.6 percent  decline  in the U.S. price  in 1975. 
46. Bergsten  notes that the voluntary  restraints  by the major foreign suppliers  of 
fresh and frozen meat hit low-income  families relatively  severely  since most meat im- 
ports  are used  in the manufacture  of low-cost  items  such as frankfurters  and hamburgers 
("Cost of Restrictions,"  p. 4). President  Nixon liberalized  these controls somewhat  in 
1970 because  of these adverse  price effects.  This exercise  ignores  the recent suspension 
of the beef quota. 
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the costs of quotas  seem  high relative  to the previous  tariff  estimates,  two 
facts  should  be kept  in mind.  First,  the deadweight  losses  of the restrictions 
increase  with the square of the ad valorem  equivalent  tariff  rate.  The rela- 
tively high rates on petroleum,  steel, and textiles generate  large losses 
relative  to the size of imports. Second,  loss of tariff-equivalent  revenue 
accounted  for almost  a third  of the U.S. social  loss due to quotas.  Tariffs, 
of course,  do not impose  this cost. 
COSTS  OF  EXISTING  RESTRICTIONS  ON  U.S.  EXPORTS 
What would  be the benefits  to the United States  of removal  of foreign 
barriers  to its exports?  In the import section we assumed  for simplicity 
that the United States  was a price taker  in world markets;  that is, tariff 
reductions  in the United States  would not increase  world prices notice- 
ably. However,  since  countries  tend to specialize  more  in production  than 
consumption,  foreign  demand  for U.S. exports  cannot be taken as per- 
fectly elastic.  Thus I assume  that the short-run  elasticity  of demand  for 
U.S. manufactured  exports is  -1.0  and that the long-run elasticity  is 
_4.5.48 
U.S. exports  can be broken  into three groups:  manufactured  goods in 
which  exports  are an important  part of domestic  production,  agricultural 
exports,  and all other  exports.  In the last category  exports  are quite  small 
relative  to total production  and the export  supply  elasticity  is likely  to be 
extremely  high, so that foreign  tariff  cuts will not significantly  affect  the 
price of these goods to producers  or consumers  in the United States. 
Hence, the welfare  effects  are negligible  and the category  can be ignored 
here.  In the first  case,  U.S. industries  in which  manufactured  exports  were  a 
substantial  portion  of sales exported  an estimated  $13.5 billion worth of 
goods and sold $77.3 billion in the United States  in 1971.49 This leaves 
48. In Magee, "Tariffs  and U.S. Trade,"  the direct  price elasticities  of demand  used 
for U.S. exports in a fifteen-region  model were -2.7,  while the cross-price  elasticities 
with respect to other suppliers  to each market averaged  1.7. Therefore,  the elasticity 
appropriate  for foreign  tariff  elimination  on both U.S. and foreign  exports  is the differ- 
ence between  these two elasticities,  or -1.0  in the short run. The assumption  that the 
long-run  demand  elasticity  equals -4.5  is arbitrary. 
49. BLS data indicate  that in 1967,  U.S. manufacturing  industries  whose exports  ac- 
counted  for a substantial  portion of total sales exported  $9.49 billion; the value of total 
shipments  in these industries  in 1967 was $71.84 billion. The included industries are 
those in which exports  "represented  10 percent  or more of the value of domestic out- 
put ...  [or]  represented  at least 6 percent  of domestic  output  and had a value  [of exports] Stephen  P. Magee  675 
$22.3  billion  in "other"  U.S. exports  (which  are not examined  here),  and 
$7.8 billion in agricultural  exports, giving a total export level of $43.6 
billion.50 
Manufactured  exports.  Considering  first  the $13.5 billion in 1971  U.S. 
manufactured  exports  that are an important  part of total production  in 
their  respective  industries,  I assume  domestic  supply  and demand  elastici- 
ties for these goods that give plausible  values of the U.S. export  supply 
elasticities.  It turns  out that the domestic  elasticities  given  in the informal 
table on page 665 for directly  competitive  U.S. imports  give reasonable 
values  for the U.S. export  supply  elasticities,  s,, using  formula  (7): 
(7)  sx =  S (e-  -  ed) +  ed, 
short-run  s,  =  6.7 [0.5 -  (-0.25)]  +  (-0.25)  =  4.8, 
long-run  s-  =  6.7 [1.5 -  (-0.75)]  +  (-0.75)  =  14.4, 
where  S is the value  of the supply  of exportable  products  produced  in the 
United  States  in 1971  and  equals  the sum  of the amount  sold  in the domes- 
tic market, D, plus the amount exported, X. In this case, S =  (D +  X) = 
(77.3 +  13.5) =  $90.8 billion in 1971, and S/X  =  6.7, giving a short-run 
supply  elasticity  of 4.8 and a long-run  elasticity  of 14.451  The supply  and 
demand  elasticities  for U.S. exports  are as follows: 
Elasticity  Short-run  Long-run 
Foreign  demand,  d.  -1.0  -4.5 
U.S. export  supply,  s.  4.8  14.4 
of at least $150 million" (BLS, "Productivity  and Unit Labor Costs," pp.  507-08). 
From subtraction,  $62.35  billion is the value of output  in these industries  that was sold 
in the United States. The $9.49 billion in exports was 31 percent  of total nonmilitary 
merchandise  exports  of $30.6  billion  in 1967.  The growth  factor  for 1967-71  of 24 percent 
on domestic  goods output (Economic  Report  of the  President,  January  1972, p. 200) im- 
plies  that domestic  sales  would  have  been $77.3  billion  in 1971.  Taking  31 percent  of total 
merchandise  exports in 1971 ($43.6 billion) equals $13.5 billion for the exports in 
question. 
50. Jack J. Bame, "Balance  of Payments  Developments:  Fourth Quarter  and Year 
1971,"  Survey  of Current  Business,  Vol. 52 (March 1972),  p. 39. 
51. In Stephen  P. Magee, "A Theoretical  and Empirical  Examination  of Supply  and 
Demand Relationships  in U.S. International  Trade,"  A Study for the Council of Eco- 
nomic  Advisers  (October  1970),  the short-run  (annual  data,  unlagged)  U.S. export  supply 
elasticity  was estimated  to be in the region of 10. However,  this is for total exports  and 
includes the high-elasticity  items in which exports are a small proportion  of domestic 
sales. Thus, the short-run  elasticity  of 4.8 used here is not unreasQnable  for the exports 
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These  elasticities  can be used  with  the foreign  tariff  rates  to calculate  the 
change  in the price  of exportables  in the  United  States  if foreign  tariffs  were 
eliminated.  The average  ad valorem  tariff  rate  on dutiable  U.S. exports  to 
the European  Economic Community,  the five largest countries of the 
European  Free  Trade  Association  (EFTA),  Canada,  and  Japan  is 11.3  per- 
cent,  using  1968  weights.52  The  effective  tariff  on the price  including  tariff  is 
thus 0.113/1.113,  or 10.1  percent,  which  is denoted  as %AT. The percent- 
age  change  in the dollar  price  of U.S. exports,  %zAPX,  is shown  in equation 
(8): 
(8)  %zAPX  =  (d  -"  )  %AT. 
Substituting  the values  of the supply  and  demiand  elasticities  into equation 
(8) yields  the following  percentage  changes  in the price  of exportables  in the 
United  States: 
short-run  %OAPX  =  -  1.0  8)10.  1  1.75 
long-run  %APX  =  (45-144)  10.  1  2.40. 
In the short run, foreign  tariff  elimination  raises  U.S. home prices  of ex- 
portables  by 1.75 percent,  while the long-run  prices of U.S. exportables 
rise by 2.4 percent.  Foreign  tariff  reductions  lower  the delivered  prices  of 
U.S. goods abroad  but raise  the prices  received  by U.S. exporters  as the 
increase  in the foreign  demand  causes  U.S. producers  to move  up their  ex- 
port supply  function. 
The percentage  changes  in the price  of U.S. exports  just calculated  can 
be treated  as the tariff  changes  were  in the section  on imports.  Thus, t = 
0.0175  in the short  run  and t = 0.024  in the long run.  The short-  and  long- 
run effects  of foreign  tariff  elimination  on U.S. exportables  are shown  in 
Table  6. The  long-run  results  in that  table  are  shown  in Figure  5. I assume, 
as before,  that OP8-  =  1. The  total  gain  in welfare  in the United  States  as a 
result  of foreign  tariff  elimination  is equal  to the sum  of the deadweight  loss 
triangles  plus the amount  of tariff  revenue  that was formerly  collected  in 
foreign  customs  but is now captured  by U.S. exporters.  These  gains  are  the 
sum of areas  D and E and equal $246 million  in the short  run and $380 
million  per year  in the long run. 
52. These numbers are derivable from GATT, Basic Docuimentation.  See Magee, 
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Table  6 also shows  that the value  of the domestic  production  of export- 
ables  increases  by $2.4 billion  per year  in the short  run and $5.6 billion  in 
the  long run.  Because  the U.S. price  of exportables  rises,  U.S. consumers  of 
exportables  are worse  off: In the short  run the consumer  loss is $1.4 bil- 
lion and in the long run it equals  $1.8 billion.  The increase  in producers' 
surplus  equals  the sum  of the  redistribution  effect  from  U.S. consumers  plus 
elimination  of the deadweight  losses plus area E, which is a portion of 
revenue  formerly  collected  abroad  on U.S. exports.  The value  of U.S. ex- 
ports  increases  by $1.4 billion  in the short  run and $5.1 billion  in the long 
run,  owing  to three  factors:  the greater  supply  of exportables  in the United 
States,  the reduced  demand  for exportable  products  in the United  States  as 
a result  of their  increase  in price,  and  the revenue  formerly  paid  to foreign 
customs  plus the deadweight  losses. 
Agricultural  exports.  The gains from removal of restrictions  on U.S. 
agricultural  products  are potentially  large. Even though only about 20 
percent  of U.S. exports  are agricultural  products,  the nation does have a 
comparative  advantage  in a number  of products  that are subject  to heavy 
protection  abroad and restricted  production  at home. In 1969, exports 
provided  14 percent  of farm  cash receipts;  however,  agricultural  produc- 
tion was 7.3 percent  below  potential  and exports  could  be increased  by 77 
percent,  according  to Upchurch,  if idle resources  were  utilized.53  In con- 
trast  with the usual  case, an expansion  of U.S. agricultural  exports,  even 
without  an increase  in their price, would still mean a U.S. welfare  gain 
since  domestic  programs  designed  to keep farm  resources  idle in order  to 
maintain  farm income could be dismantled.  The opportunity  costs are 
near  zero for the resources-namely,  land-that  could be used to expand 
U.S. agricultural  exports;  every  dollar  of additional  exports  thus  represents 
an addition  to U.S. welfare.  Lawrence  B. Krause,  in a study  under  way at 
this writing,  and D. Gale Johnson  agree  that the elimination  of barriers 
against  U.S. agricultural  exports  in Western  Europe  and Japan  could  lead 
to an annual  expansion  of at least $3 billion  to $5 billion in U.S. exports 
and  welfare.54  In  what  follows,  I assume  a short-run  gain  of $3 billion  and  a 
53. M. L. Upchurch,  "Competitive  Position of U.S. Agriculture,"  in United  States 
International  Economic  Policy in an Interdependent  World,  Vol. 1, pp. 836-38. 
54. D. Gale Johnson, "The Impact of Freer Trade on North American Agricul- 
ture"  (paper  delivered  at the  joint session  of the American  Economic  Association  and the 
American  Agricultural  Economics  Association,  Toronto, December  29, 1972). 678  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 3:1972 
Table  6. Short-run  and  Long-run  Static  Effects,  from  1971  Base,  of 
Elimination  of Tariffs  on Major  U.S. Manufactured  Exports 
Millions of dollars,  annual  flows 
Change  in variable 
due to price 
change 
Short  Long  Analogous 
Variable  and  formula  run  run  area in Figure  5 
Deadweight  loss (D WL)  elimination  10  56  D = D1 +  D2 
Consumption,  -0.5t2Ded  3  17  D2 
Production,  0.5t2Se8  7  39  D 
Increased  value  of domestic  production 2,404  5,599  I+  2D2 +  E +  G1  + 2D1 
Redistribution:  consumer  loss,  1,350  1,872  1 
tD -  0.5t2Ded 
Redistribution:  producer  gain,  1,596  2,252  I +  D +  E 
tS  +  0.5t2  Se, 
Increased  value  of exports  1,388  5,096  G2 +  2D2 +  E +  2D1 +  G1 
Increased  supply,  tSe,(1 +  t)  808  3,347  G1 +  2D1 
Reduced  demand,  tDed(I +  t)  344  1,425  G2 +  2D2 
Revenue,  t(S -  D)  236  324  E 
Total U.S. welfare  gain  246  380  D +  E 
Sources: Derived from the indicated formulas, where all the symbols and the values of ed and es are as 
defined in Table 4, and (from text) D  =  $77.3 billion, S  =  $90.8 billion, and t  = 0.0175 and 0.024 for the 
short and long run, respectively.  The calculations were made from data before rounding. 
long-run  gain  of $5 billion  per  year.  Thus,  the biggest  gains  to free  trade  for 
U.S. exports  are  in the agricultural  area. 
ADJUSTMENT  FOR TRANSITION  COSTS,  AGGREGATION 
BIAS,  AND  GROWTH 
Transition  costs. Previous  sections  have established  that the gains  from 
elimination  of trade  restrictions  are small  in the short  run but build  up as 
the economy  adjusts  to free  trade.  However,  the costs involved  in moving 
resources  from  one sector  of the economy  to another  must  be considered. 
Trade  liberalization  moves resources  out of import-competing  activities 
and into nontradable  and export activities.  Since this analysis  takes a 
long-run  view of the efficiency  question,  I measure  these  resource  shifts  at 
full employment.  The nation  has been  both above  and below  full employ- 
ment in the past decade  and, in any case, these calculations  should not 
include  the cost of failure  of aggregate  demand  policy,  in either  direction. Stephen P. Magee  679 
Figure  5. Long-run  Static  Effects  from  1971  Base  of Elimination  of Tariffs  on 
U.S. Major  Manufactured  Exports 
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(billions  of dollars, 
Area,  annual  flows)  Definition 
I  1.9  Redistribution  from consumers  to pro- 
ducers 
H1 +  G2  77.3  Old level of domestic  consumption 
D  =  D1 +  D2  0.1  Deadweight  loss 
E  0.3  Old value of foreign  tariff  revenue 
G2 +  2D1 +  E +  2D2 +  G1  5.1  Change in the value of exports 
F  13.5  Old value of exports 
RSTU  18.6  New value of exports 
Gi  3.3  Increased  supply  of exports  (one of the 
components  in change  in value of ex- 
ports) 
G2  1.4  Reduced demand for exports (one of 
the components in change in value 
of exports) 
Sources: Same as Table 6. 
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Moving  resources  is not frictionless,  and  the need  here  is to measure  the 
cost of moving  below  potential  gross  national  product  (or inside  the econ- 
omy's production  possibility  curve) in the transition  period after trade 
liberalization.  There  is no clean  measure  of this social cost: As a proxy,  I 
follow Baldwin  and  Mutti55  and use the income  (and presumably  the pro- 
duction)  lost by labor as it moves from one sector  to another.  For sim- 
plicity,  I ignore  the short-run  output  response,  calculate  the long-run  out- 
put change  and  the implied  change  in employment,  multiply  this  by a wage 
rate and an assumed  duration  of unemployment,  and spread this loss 
equally  over  the five-year  period  that I assume  industries  require  to adjust 
to changes  in trade  barriers  and reach  a new long-run  equilibrium. 
The  results  for  both U.S. imports  and  U.S. exports  are  shown  in Table  7. 
The notes to the table  explain  the mechanics  of the calculations.  The pur- 
pose of the table  is not  a precise  gauge  but a crude  measure  of the economic 
cost of moving  resources;  among  its flaws  are  the failure  to examine  foreign 
nontariff  barriers  and  the guesswork  that underlies  many  of the estimates. 
Because  people  must  move  from  one  job to another,  expanding  exports  en- 
tails  costs  just as contracting  imports  does, but the costs are  lower  because 
less time is lost, among  other  things.  To the extent  that resources  leaving 
import-competing  industries  are absorbed into  export industries,  the 
transition  costs are overstated.  However,  the skill requirements  in the two 
generally  differ  sufficiently  that this overstatement  will be small. The last 
three  rows  of the table  give  the present  value  of the  job-change  costs  for the 
assumed  five-year  period  over  which  they  take  place. 
Aggregation  bias. In addition  to the costs of moving  resources,  correc- 
tion must be made for certain  aggregation  biases in the estimates  of the 
deadweight  losses  imposed  by U.S. and foreign  tariffs.  Tables  4 and  6 indi- 
cate that, for fixed  values  of the relevant  elasticity  and the base, the social 
cost of a tariff  is a function  of the square  of the tariff  rate.  The deadweight 
loss calculations  would not be subject  to aggregation  bias if each of the 
component  tariff  rates  were  equal.  However,  if they  are  not (as is the case), 
aggregation  bias exists,  and  it increases  with  the variance  of the tariff  rates 
around  the mean.  To correct  this situation,  I have constructed  the "root 
mean-squared  tariff,"  tr, which, at the aggregate  level, yields a bias-free 
estimate  of the welfare  loss of the tariff  structure: 
(9)  tr  aiti, 
55. "Policy  Problems." Stephen  P. Magee  681 
where  ti is the middle  of tariff  range  i (for  example,  ti =  0.015 in the range 
between  t = 0.01 and t = 0.02) and ai is the share of total trade with 
tariff  rates falling in range i. The average  tariff  rate used in the earlier 
calculations, ta, is 
(10)  ta =  aiti 
The proposition that tr >  ta can be illustrated in the following two cases. 
Both deal with two products,  with equal weights  in imports  (al =  a2  = 
0.5) and the same mean total tariff  rate;  in case A, t1 =  10 and t2 =  10, 
while in case B, t1 = 0 and t2 =  20. The subscripts  indicate  the product 
number.  According  to equations  (2) and  (9), the true  welfare  costs of case 
B are greater  than those of case A: 
Case A  DWL =  0.5emV(0.5  X  0.12  +  0.5 X  0.12) =  0.01(0.5emV) 
Case B  DWL =  0.5emV(0.5  X 02 +  0.5 X 0.22) =  0.02(0.5emV). 
The deadweight  loss estimates  for imports  in Table  4 ($97 million and 
$291  million)  and equation  (2) ($81 million  and $202  million)  and for ex- 
ports  in Table  6 ($10 million  and $56  million)  must  be adjusted  upward  by 
a correction  factor,  C: 
2 
(11)  C  =  tr 
a 
Using tariff dispersion  data from the GATT study,56  I  estimate that 
tr =  0.100  and  ta  =  0.059 for total (not just dutiable)  U.S. imports,  so 
that C = 2.87. Multiplying  this factor times the deadweight  losses of 
Table  4 gives  the following  estimates,  which  are free of aggregation  bias: 
Short-run  Long-run 
deadweight  losses  deadweight  losses 
(millions  of dollars)  (millions  of dollars) 
Directly competitive  278  835 
Other  232  580 
Total annual  losses  510  1,415 
As a proxy  for  the  calculation  of t, for  U.S. exports,  I use  data  on dispersion 
for "world  tariffs,"  which,  in addition  to imports  into the United States, 
includes  those of the EEC and nine other  major  developed  countries.  The 
results yield t, =  0.083 and ta =  0.051, so that C =  2.65. Based on this 
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factor  times  the deadweight  losses  in Table  6, and  the revenue  components, 
$262  million  is the short-run  and $472  million  the actual  long-run  annual 
costs of foreign  tariffs  on U.S. exports of manufactures.  The following 
discussion  relies  on these corrected  figures.  Three  aspects  of these adjust- 
ments  should  be noted.  First,  the large  sizes  of the correction  factors  indi- 
cate that the tariff distributions  are considerably  skewed. Second, the 
larger  adjustment  factor for U.S. imports  reflects  the "tariff  disparities" 
issue  for which  the United  States  had to make  concessions  in the Kennedy 
Round.  Third,  the tariff  distribution  data  were  not available  separately  for 
the two categories  of imports  used here. Thus, a single  correction  factor 
calculated  from all manufactured  trade  was applied  to both import  cate- 
gories. 
Growth.  Thus  far, the analysis  has been static.  The only changes  in the 
flows through  time involved  movement  from short-run  to long-run  posi- 
tions. If in fact  domestic  supply  and demand  grow  at an annual  rate,  g, the 
estimate  of deadweight  loss (see Table  4) for consumption  in year  i can be 
written 
(12)  DWLi =  0.5t2edDo  (1 + g)i, 
where  g is the proportional  annual  growth  rate and Do is the initial  quan- 
tity of the importable  demanded.  The present  value  of the DWL  in year i 
can be written 
(13)  .5t2edDo(1 +  g)i 
(l+  r)t 
=  0.5t2edDo(l  +  d)-i, 
where  d is the discount  factor,  incorporating  both growth  and the rate of 
capitalization,  r, and approximately  equal  to r -  g. I assume  that the ap- 
propriate  rate of social capitalization,  r, is somewhere  between  6 and 12 
percent.  The real  growth  rate  for the economy  as a whole  and for the con- 
sumption  of items  directly  competitive  with imports  can be approximated 
at 4 percent. Thus, assuming r =  0.08 and g  =  0.04 gives d =  0.04, that 
is, a discount  factor  of 4 percent. 
The  present  value  of the consumption  deadweight  loss, including  growth, 
is the sum of all future  deadweight  losses  discounted  at 4 percent.  Table  8 
gives  the costs of U.S. tariffs  and quotas  at alternative  discount  rates  of 4 
percent,  7 percent,  and 10 percent.  While  4 percent  is probably  the most 
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discounting  in the absence  of growth  or alternative  gaps  between  r and  g. 
The  next  to last  line  of Table  8 gives  the  total  present  cost of each  restriction 
and  the previous  three  lines  provide  some  feel  for the time  path  of the total 
present  value.  For example,  59 percent  (12.1/20.4)  of the gain  from  elimi- 
nating  the tariff  on directly  competitive  imports  comes  after  year 15 when 
a 4 percent  discount  is used. The components  of the present  values are 
broken  into four  time  periods.  If one believed  that Mundellian-type  factor 
movements  (see note 21 and the related  discussion)  would  eliminate  trade 
after  fifteen  years,  the fourth  period  should  be ignored. 
The  income  losses  due  to job changes  in the  first  five  years  are  subtracted 
from the gains, and the results  shown  in the line labeled,  "total, 1 to 5, 
net of job-change  costs."  For nonquota  imports  in the first  five  years,  the 
costs  ofjob changes  absorb  nearly  a third  of the short-run  gain  from  reduc- 
tion in the  trade  barrier.  In the  long run,  the gains  from  free  trade  are  more 
important.  Since  most  political  horizons  are  rather  short,  this  helps  explain 
part of the political  resistance  to freer  trade.  Table  9 gives  the same  data 
for U.S. exports,  and shows  that the gains  to the United States  from free 
world  trade  for agricultural  products  dominate.  Remember,  however,  that 
no estimates  are made in this paper of the costs to the United States  of 
foreign  nonagricultural  quotas  and nontariff  barriers.  Also, since  there  is 
no reason to believe that trade liberalization  will cause changes  in the 
U.S. trade  balance,  no calculations  are made here for the effects  of cur- 
rency  realignments  induced  by trade  liberalization. 
Moving  to More  Restricted  Trade 
CUTTING  TRADE TO 1965-69  LEVELS 
An extreme  protectionist  proposal  is contained  in Title  III of the Burke- 
Hartke  bill to amend  the tariff  and trade  laws,  introduced  in the Congress 
in September  1971.  They  provided  that  the quantity  of U.S. imports  in the 
first  year (1972),  both by product  categories  and by country,  should  not 
exceed  the average  quantities  imported  during  the calendar  years  1965-69. 
The product  categories  were to be defined  by a proposed  United States 
Foreign  Trade  and  Investment  Commission  (FTIC)  on the  basis  of the five- 
digit and seven-digit  classifications  used in the Tariff Schedules  of the 
United States,  Annotated.  Products  were  to be grouped  so as not to "ad- 1.0  N  ON  tn  O  t-  -  0  -o 
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versely  affect  the assembly  or production  of any item or component  in the 
United States."57 
The bills provided  that after  1972  the quotas  could be increased  but the 
ratio of imports  to domestic  production  was to remain  at the 1965-69 
levels.  The FTIC  could decrease  the level of any quota  if it found  that im- 
ports were "inhibiting  the production  of any manufactured  product,"58 
a particularly  striking  provision  since  the whole  purpose  of competition,  in- 
cluding foreign competition,  is to  disrupt inefficient  production.  Con- 
versely, the FTIC could relax the quotas on inputs and intermediate 
products  that  would  "inhibit  the production"  of U.S. goods.  If in any  year, 
the FTIC determined  that a foreign  country  was unlikely  to make  full use 
of its quota, the bill provided  that "it shall so inform  the President,  and 
shall  distribute  the quota  among  new or existing  suppliers  as the President 
may direct."59 
The only imports  exempt  under  Title III are goods in which  the FTIC 
decides  that (1) quantitative  limitations  on U.S. imports  are already  effec- 
tive  (through  voluntary  bilateral  or multilateral  government-to-government 
agreement  or legal controls);  (2) "failure  to import  the goods would  cause 
long-term  disruption  of United States markets";  and (3) "the domestic 
industry  producing  competing goods has consistently  failed to  make 
technological  innovations  required  to remain  competitive  with  foreign  pro- 
ducers."60 
What would be the effects  of the quantitative  rollbacks  in trade from 
1971  to the 1965-69  levels  (1972  data  were  not available  at the time of this 
writing)?  Table  2 listed  those items  that would  be excepted  from  the con- 
trols  because  of existing  quotas  or government-to-government  agreements. 
Excluding  steel,  these  imports  amount  to approximately  $7.2  billion  (based 
on 1971  data).61  If the FTIC granted  exemptions  to avoid long-term  dis- 
ruption of U.S. markets  for goods totally without  domestic  substitutes, 
another  $2.8  billion  would  be exempted  (out of the $24.1  billion  of imports 
in the "other"  category),  making  total exemptions  approximately  $10 bil- 
57. H.R. 10914,  Title III, Sec. 303(e); S. 2592, Title III, Sec. 303(e). 
58. H.R. 10914,  Title III, Sec. 301(b)(2)(B). 
59. Ibid., Sec. 301(f). 
60. Ibid., Sec. 301(d)(1)-(4). These exemptions would not apply, presumably,  to 
automobiles  imported  into the United States  under  the Canadian  auto agreement  since 
no restrictions  are involved. 
61. Inadequate  data on steel dictated  excluding  it from the exemptions  considered  in 
this analysis,  and it is considered  subject  to rollback  here. Stephen P. Magee  689 
lion. This would reduce  1971 imports  subject  to rollback  from the total 
import  level of $45.5  billion  to $35.6  billion. 
Columns  (5) and (6) of Table 10 show the average  1965-69 and 1971 
quantities  of U.S. imports  in millions  of 1958  dollars,  and column  (7) the 
ratio  between  them.  However,  trade  will not be cut back  for each  country 
in proportion  to the amounts  indicated  in column  (7) because  of the $10 
billion  in exemptions.  Columns  (1), (3), and (4) give the value  of U.S. im- 
ports  in 1971  dollars,  imports  excluding  exemptions,  and the exemptions 
themselves.  Columns  (8) and (9) give the portions  of trade affected  and 
unaffected  by the cutbacks. 
The ratio  of the proposed  to existing  1971  total U.S. imports  by country 
equals  the cutback  ratio  in column  (7) times  the ratio  of applicable  to total 
trade  in column  (8) plus column  (9). This is shown in column  (10). The 
percentage  decreases  in the quantities  of total imports  are  in column  (11). 
For the EEC  countries,  the import  cutbacks  range  from  20 to 31 percent; 
for EFTA  countries,  around  10  percent;  for Canada,  29 percent;  for Japan, 
44 percent;  and for the less developed  countries  (LDCs)  (the bulk of the 
rest-of-the-world  region),  13 percent. 
The price  elasticities  of demand  for U.S. imports  by country,  estimated 
using 1951-69 annual  data, are shown  in column  (12). Column  (13) gives 
the percentage  increase  in the price  of U.S. imports  by country,  using  the 
percentage  decreases  in the quantities  in column  (11) divided  by the price 
elasticities. 
Two types of price  increases  are calculated:  those based on total trade 
(column 13) and those based on trade that is subject  to the rollbacks 
(column  14).  In the  latter  case,  the prices  of U.S. imports  from  twelve  of the 
fifteen  regions  experience  price  increases  of less than  20 percent.  Low price 
elasticities  of demand  for imports  from Canada  and the LDCs cause  the 
prices of their products  to rise by 71 and 38 percent,  respectively.  The 
average  import  price  increase  for all products  subject  to the quantitative 
cutback  is 36 percent.  For simplicity,  I assume  that  the supply  elasticities  of 
U.S. imports  by country  are  high, so that  the proportionate  cutback  in the 
quantities  and the values  of trade  are the same. 
Thus,  a decrease  in the  value  of total  trade  shown  in column  (15)  is simply 
the quantity  rollback  in column  (11) times the value of 1971  imports  in 
column (1). The hardest-hit  countries  are Germany,  with declines  in ex- 
ports  to the United  States  of $1.1  billion;  Canada,  with $3.7  billion;  Japan, 
with $3.2 billion; and the LDCs, with $1.7 billion.  The total value of the 690  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 3:1972 
Table  10. Effect  on 1971  Import  Levels  of Quantitative  Cutback  to 1965-69  Levels 
Dollar amounts  in millions 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
U.S. imports  Share of 
U.S. imports  (1958 dollars)  trade 
Ratio of  affected  by 
Total,  Imports  Average  1965-69  Burke- 
1971  Share of  excluding  Exceptions  quantity  1971  to 1971  Hartke 
Country  imports  total  exceptions  (1) -  (3)  1965-69  quantity  (5)/(6)  (3)/(1) 
United Kingdom  $2,461  0.054  $2,193  $268  $1,647  $1,912  0.861  0.89 
Belgium  848  0.019  773  75  621  802  0.774  0.91 
Denmark  286  0.006  270  16  189  242  0.781  0.94 
France  1,080  0.024  1,010  70  703  936  0.751  0.94 
Germany  3,665  0.080  3,476  189  1,925  2,846  0.676  0.95 
Italy  1,405  0.031  1,211  194  967  1,334  0.725  0.86 
Netherlands  532  0.012  458  74  346  448  0.772  0.86 
Norway  172  0.004  168  4  137  151  0.908  0.98 
Sweden  455  0.010  448  7  315  359  0.877  0.98 
Switzerland  492  0.011  458  34  329  337  0.977  0.93 
Canada  12,723  0.279  11,737  986  7,027  10,309  0.681  0.92 
Japan  7,244  0.159  6,577  667  3,389  6,530  0.518  0.91 
Australia  621  0.013  301  320  389  567  0.686  0.48 
South Africa  285  0.006  158  127  236  301  0.784  0.55 
Rest of world  13,277  0.292  6,321  6,956  9,193  12,586  0.730  0.48 
All  countries  45,546  1.000  35,559  9,987  ...  ...  ...  0.78 
Sources: The 1971  trade data in columns (1)-(4) were provided  by Mary Jane Wignot, Office  of the Special  Representa- 
tive for Trade  Negotiations. The import data for 1965-69 came from U.S. Department of Agriculture,  Economic Research 
Service, Foreign Agricultural  Trade of the United  States, annual issues. The total country export price indexes used to 
deflate the value data, with 1958 =  100, were computed from various issues of International Monetary Fund, Inter- 
national Financial Statistics. Price elasticities (column 12), based on annual data for  1951-69, are from Stephen P. 
decrease  in U.S. imports  is $11.2  billion, about 25 percent  of total trade 
and 32 percent  on trade  affected  by the Burke-Hartke  rollbacks. 
One  caveat  about  Table 10: At the time of writing,  data  for the 1965-69 
period  were  not available  by country  on the value  of U.S. imports  regulated 
by quotas.  Also, the price  indexes  used  to deflate  the series  included  both 
quota and nonquota  items. Including  quota items probably  leads to an 
underestimate  of the actual Burke-Hartke  cutback,  since  the quota price 
indexes  presumably  grow  faster  than  the average.  Using an index  including 
these  items  to deflate  the values  of trade  leads  to an underestimate  of the 
growth  in the quantities  of U.S. imports  from 1965-69  to 1971,  and  hence 
an underestimate  of the cutback. 
In the tariff  exercise  performed  in an earlier  section,  the only  variation  in 
the price declines  in each category  was due to differences  in tariff  rates. 
Thus,  if the assumption  of a high  foreign  supply  elasticity  for U.S. imports 
holds, the percentage  declines  in the import  prices of dutiables  depends 
only on the tariffs  and  is independent  of the demand  elasticities.  Use of the Stephen  P. Magee  691 
as Proposed  in Burke-Hartke Legislation, by Country 
(9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13)  (14)  (15)  (16) 
Price increase in U.S. 
Ratio of  (percent) 
proposed  to  Percentage 
Share of  actual 1971  decrease in  Absolute  On  On  Value  of  New value 
unaffected  trade  total trade  value of price  total  noflexempt  decrease  in  of 1971 
trade  (7) X (8)  [1.0 -  (10)]  elasticity of  imports  imports  1971 imports  imports 
1.0 -(8)  +  (9)  X 100  demanda  (11)1(12)  [(I)  -  (7)1(12)]  (1) X (11)  (1) -  (15) 
0.11  0.876  12.4  1.55  8.0  9.0  $305  $2,154 
0.09  0.794  20.6  4.09  5.0  5.6  175  671 
0.06  0.793  20.7  1.11  18.6  19.8  59  226 
0.06  0.765  23.5  5.06  4.6  4.9  254  826 
0.05  0.692  30.8  2.50  12.3  12.8  1,129  2,536 
0.14  0.764  23.6  3.36  7.0  8.3  332  1,073 
0.14  0.803  19.7  2.98  6.6  7.7  105  429 
0.02  0.909  9.1  1.58  5.8  5.7  16  156 
0.02  0.879  12.1  3.35  3.6  3.5  55  400 
0.07  0.978  2.2  1.76  1.3  1.3  11  482 
0.08  0.706  29.4  0.45  65.3  71.1  3,741  8,982 
0.09  0.561  43.9  3.52  12.5  13.6  3,180  4,064 
0.52  0.848  15.2  l.Ob  15.2  31.0  94  527 
0.45  0.881  11.9  1.20  9.9  18.3  34  253 
0.52  0.870  13.0  0.71  18.3  38.0  1,726  11,551 
0.22  ...  ...  1.53  ...  35.9  11,216  34,330 
Magee, "Tariffs and U.S.  Trade," A  Study for the Council of Economic Advisers, Working Paper 14 (June 1972; 
processed). The calculations are based on data before rounding. 
a.  All elasticities in the column are negative. 
b.  This elasticity was statistically  insignificant.  However, I assume for simplicity that it equals 1. 
import elasticities  reported  on page 665 to calculate  the percentage  in- 
crease  in the prices  of importables  in the United States  as a result  of the 
Burke-Hartke  cutback  would understate  the actual price increase.  The 
reason  is that  the distribution  elasticities  are  less important  when  the price 
changes  are more or less exogenously  set (by tariff  changes)  whereas  they 
must  be incorporated  in calculating  an aggregate  price  elasticity  if the com- 
ponents  are endogenously  determined.62 
62. Sufficient  conditions  for the consistency  of disaggregated  price  elasticities  and an 
estimated  aggregate  price elasticity  have been discussed  in T. S. Barker,  "Aggregation 
Error and Estimates  of the U.K. Import Demand Function,"  in Kenneth Hilton and 
David F. Heathfield  (eds.), The  Econometric  Study of the United  Kingdom  (Macmillan, 
1970), pp. 115-43. An elaboration  of this technique  is discussed  and applied to U.S. 
trade  in Magee, "Tariffs  and U.S. Trade."  This problem  was first  brought  to my atten- 
tion in a paper by William  H. White, "Bias in Export Substitution  Elasticities  Derived 
through  Use of Cross  Section  Sub-Market  Data" (International  Monetary  Fund, March 
1970; processed).  The total elasticity  that is consistent  with disaggregated  data can be 
written  as follows: 
e  =  E  e;(m;/m)vi, 692  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 3:1972 
The  data  in Table  10  can  be used  to calculate  the implicit  aggregate  uni- 
form price elasticity  of demand  associated  with the Burke-Hartke  roll- 
back.  Since  the calculations  are  done  at a disaggregated  (country)  level,  the 
average  import  price  increase  incorporates  the appropriate  country  distri- 
bution  elasticities  into  the aggregate  elasticity.  Since  the  price  of nonexempt 
imports  rises  by 36 percent  and  the quantity  declines  by 32 percent  (11.22/ 
35.56),  the implicit  total price  elasticity  is -0.89.  However,  this number  is 
lower than desirable  for present  purposes  since it is based on price  elas- 
ticities  (column 12 of Table 10) that were estimated  on total trade (in- 
cluding  quota  items).  Assuming  that  the effective  price  elasticity  of demand 
for quota  items  is 0 and using  0.16 for the 1971  weight  of quota items  in 
U.S. imports,  the short-run  elasticity  for this exercise  on nonquota  imports 
is -1.06, which  for simplicity  is taken  as unity  (-1.0).  The  long-run  import 
demand  elasticities  used  above  were  approximately  2.5 times  the short-run 
elasticities.  Thus,  the assumption  in this  section  is that  the  long-run  demand 
elasticity  for imports  is -2.5. 
Since the Burke-Hartke  proposal  reduces  the quantity  of dutiable  im- 
ports  by 32 percent  (from $35.6  billion  in 1971  to $24.3  billion),  the price 
rises  by 32 percent  in the short  run  and  by 12  percent  in the  long run.  These 
are  equivalent  to 32 percent  and 12 percent  ad valorem  tariff  levels  on top 
of existing  tariffs.  Since  tariffs  are  eliminated  under  the Burke-Hartke  pro- 
posals, the net welfare  distortion  of Burke-Hartke  must be measured  by 
calculating  the total welfare  cost fromfree  trade  levels  and  then  subtracting 
the costs of existing  tariffs. 
The ad valorem  average  tariff  rate on dutiable  trade  is now 6.8 percent 
(2.5/36.4).  100. This implies  that the long-run  and short-run  ad valorem 
equivalents  of the Burke-Hartke  proposal  above  world  prices  are  41.0 per- 
cent and 19.6 percent,  respectively.63  Equation  (2) serves  to calculate  the 
where  e =  total import price  elasticity 
ei  =  disaggregated  elasticities 
(mi/m) = share of category  i in imports 
vi = distribution  elasticity 
=  (dpi/pA)/(dp/p) 
The variable  vi is called  the distribution  elasticity.  It indicates  the average  percent  varia- 
tion in the price of category  i relative  to the total price index, p. Since prices of items 
with high elasticities  of demand  vary much  less than the aggregate  index, vi will be lower 
for high-elasticity  items than for low-elasticity  items. This negative  correlation  between 
ei and vi lowers e. 
63. One plus the ad valorem  equivalents  above world prices equals (1.32)(1.068)- 
1.410, and (1.120)(1.068)  =  1.196. Stephen P. Magee  693 
deadweight  loss portion  of the Burke-Hartke  cutback.  The  free  trade  value 
of imports  to be used  in that formula  equals  $40.9  billion  in the short  run 
and $50.1 billion in the long run.64  Thus, the deadweight  losses are as 
follows: 
Short  run  Long  run 
DWL =  0.5 (0.410)2  (1) (40.9)  DWL =  0.5 (0.196)2  (2.5) (50.1) 
=  $3.4 billion  =  $2.4 billion. 
The long-run  annual  loss from the quota is less than the short-run  loss: 
The higher  elasticity  of demand  for imports  plus the larger  long-run  free 
trade base is not sufficient  to offset the smaller  ad valorem  equivalent 
tariff. 
The second  part of the loss to the United States  from the quota is the 
tariff-equivalent  revenue  captured  by foreign suppliers.  It equals the ad 
valorem  equivalent  tariffs  (0.410  and  0.196,  respectively)  times  the  restricted 
levels of imports  under  the cutback  ($24.3 billion),  or $10.0  billion  in the 
short run and $4.8 billion in the long run. Assuming  that half of these 
amounts  are  captured  by foreign  suppliers,  the additional  social  loss is $5.0 
billion  in the short  run  and $2.4 billion  in the long run,  for a total annual 
cost of the cutback  of $8.4 billion  in the short  run and $4.8 billion  in the 
long run. 
In Table  11,  the short-  and  long-run  effects  of the Burke-Hartke  cutback 
are converted  to present  values at 4 percent,  7 percent,  and 10 percent. 
Remember  that  the  discount  rates  are  roughly  equal  to the  rate  of capitaliza- 
tion less the growth  rates  of quota imports  in the absence  of restrictions. 
Since  this rate  is likely  to be high  for a number  of years,  4 percent  is prob- 
ably the most reasonable  rate. It should be emphasized  that the calcula- 
tions performed  here  assume  no retaliation  against  U.S. exports,  and thus 
minimize  the potential  costs. 
As in the  tariff  elimination  case,  the  shift  of factors  into  import-competing 
industries  also creates  costs. Assuming  that the entrance  into industries 
under  Burke-Hartke  takes only half as long as the departure  from them 
under  freer  trade,  considered  in Table  7, and with  the directly  competitive 
and other import  categories  averaged,  present  values of the costs of job 
64. Directly competitive  dutiable  imports increase  by $2.7 billion in the short run 
and $8.0 billion in the long run with tariff  elimination  (see Table 4). Other  imports  in- 
crease by roughly $2.8 billion in the short run and $7.0 billion in the long run. Thus, 
nonquota  imports  increase  by 15.1 percent  in the short  run and 41.2 percent  in the long 
run so that free trade nonquota  imports  to which Burke-Hartke  would apply are $40.9 
billion in the short run and $50.1 billion in the long run. 694  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 3:1972 
Table 11. Annual Costs to the United States, from 1971 Base; of the 
Burke-Hartke  Cutback on Imports, and Present Values, by Alternative 
Discount Rates 
Billions of dollars 
Annual  Present value  of the cutback 
cost of the 
Year  cutback  4%  7%  10% 
1  8.4  8.4  8.4  8.4 
2  7.5  7.2  7.0  6.8 
3  6.6  6.1  5.7  5.5 
4  5.7  5.1  4.7  4.3 
5  4.8  4.1  3.6  3.3 
Total,  I to  5  ...  30.9  29.4  28.3 
Total, I to 5, including  job-change  costs  ...  31.4  29.9  28.8 
6 tol1  ...  18.2  14.9  12.5 
11 to  15  ...  14.9  10.6  7.7 
After  15  ...  69.6  26.9  12.5 
All years  ...  133.6  81.8  61.0 
All years,  including  job-change  costs  ...  134.1  82.3  61.5 
Source: The job-change costs and the annual cost for year one are developed in the text accompanying 
this section. The annual cost is discounted at 6 percent for future years. 
changes  per $1 billion change  in output  are $45 million  at 4 percent,  $43 
million  at 7 percent,  and $40  million  at 10  percent.  If the expansion  of do- 
mestic  production  roughly  equals  the reduction  in imports  of $11.2 bil- 
lion,65 the present values of the job-change costs associated  with the 
Burke-Hartke  increase  in domestic  production  are $509 million at 4 per- 
cent, $486 million at 7 percent,  and $452 million at 10 percent.  These 
changes  are small  relative  to the costs noted in Table 11.  At 4 percent,  the 
present cost of the Burke-Hartke  cutback, including  these job-change 
costs, is $134  billion. 
PROPORTIONAL  QUOTAS 
A second feature  of Title III of the Burke-Hartke  trade proposal  re- 
quired  that after 1972  trade  had been cut back to the 1965-69  levels,  the 
ratio of imports  to domestic  production  could not exceed the 1965-69 
65. This is an extremely  rough  estimate,  since  it assumes  that the reduction  in imports 
due to reduced demand equals the redistribution  effect plus the effect of production 
deadweight  losses. Stephen P. Magee  695 
ratio.  This  means  that  imports  could  grow  no faster  than  domestic  produc- 
tion. Starting  from a 1958-61  base, imports  in directly  competitive  areas 
grew by approximately  10 percent  per year until 1969, while domestic 
production  of these goods grew  by just over 5 percent.  However,  import 
growth  was accelerated  over  this period  by a number  of transitory  factors, 
so that the calculation  of the restrictive  effect  of the proportional  quota 
assumes  that imports  grow  at only 1.5 times  domestic  production.  This, in 
fact,  equals  the income  elasticity  of demand  for imports  estimated  over  the 
period 1951-69.66  This analysis  provides  a conservative  estimate  of the 
costs of the proportional  quota  by assuming  that the long-run  growth  of 
import-competing  production  equals  real GNP growth  and real imports 
grow  at 1.5  times  that  rate.  From 1950  to 1971,  U.S. real  GNP grew  at 3.55 
percent  per annum.  The income  elasticity  factor  implies  import  growth  of 
5.33 percent  per annum. 
The  technique  used  for  measuring  the effects  of the proportional  quota  is 
to assume  that imports  would grow at 5.33 percent  in the absence  of the 
quota  and 3.55 percent  with  it. The gap between  the actual  import  level in 
year  i and  the restricted  quota  level,  Ri, is given  by 
(14)  Ri =  [(1.0533)i -  (1.0355)i] Vb, 
where  Vb  is the value  of the imports  under  consideration  in the base  period. 
To provide  an estimate  of the cost of proportional  quotas  that is indepen- 
dent of the Burke-Hartke  cutback,  calculations  here  assume  that the non- 
exempt  1971  level of $35.6  billion  in imports  is the base. Columns  (1) and 
(2) of Table  12  show  the actual  and  limited  imports  starting  from  this base. 
Column  (3) is the percentage  decrease  in the quantity  of imports  due  to the 
proportional  quota.  Since  the equivalent  tariff  changes  each  year,  the short- 
run elasticity  of -1.0  used in the previous  section  is applied.  This means 
that  column  (3)  is also  the ad valorem  equivalent  tariff  implied  by the quota. 
Column  (4) gives the annual  deadweight  loss and column (5) the tariff- 
equivalent  revenue  lost to foreigners,  who are  assumed  to capture  half of it. 
The total costs of the quota  are  in column  (6), and  their  present  values  us- 
ing  4, 7, and 10  percent  discount  factors  are  shown  in columns  (7)-(9). Since 
growth  is already  accounted  for, 7 percent  is probably  a reasonable  dis- 
count  rate.  The  calculations  were  not carried  past  the  fifteenth  year  because 
66. See Houthakker  and Magee, "Income and Price Elasticities  in World Trade," 
and Magee, "Theoretical  and Empirical  Examination  of Supply  and Demand  Relation- 
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losses grow  more rapidly  than the discount  rate. Even  then, at 7 percent, 
the present  cost of the proportional  quota is $28.3 billion; it has small 
short-run  costs but the long-run  costs are high because  of the cascading 
restrictive  effect. 
Qualifications 
The calculations  in this  paper  should  be viewed  as ballpark  estimates  of 
the welfare  effects  of trade  restrictions-they are subject  to great  uncer- 
tainty. At least four nonquantifiable  factors  indicate  that the numerical 
estimates  presented  here understate  the true costs of trade restrictions. 
First, except  for some mechanical  exercises,  this paper  has ignored  some 
important  dynamic  gains  from  free  trade.  Both economists  and the public 
at large  broadly  agree  that economic  growth  leads to an increase  in wel- 
fare.  However,  Johnson  has  shown  that  if economic  growth  shifts  resources 
toward  protected  industries,  it can actually  serve  to worsen  welfare  rather 
than  augment  it.67  This occurs  because  the benefits  of growth  are offset  by 
the waste  of additional  production  in protected  industries. 
A second  qualitative  factor  is economies  of scale.  In areas  where  econo- 
mies of scale  are  important,  the production  gains  are  greater  the larger  the 
size of the market.  Clearly,  these  production  gains  will be larger  in an open 
world  economy  than in one of many  small  submarkets  separated  by high 
tariffs  or other  restrictions.  Furthermore,  the framework  used  here  cannot 
serve  to quantify  the welfare  gains from expanded  markets  in areas of 
declining  costs. 
Third,  the effect  of trade  on the antitrust  problem  should  also be con- 
sidered.  If U.S. car  manufacturers  and automobile  workers  faced  no com- 
petition  from  imported  vehicles,  the results  of wage negotiations  and the 
increases  in both the size  and  the price  of automobiles  in the United  States 
would worsen.  Thus,  free trade  is a stimulus  for greater  competition  and 
industrial  efficiency  in the United States. Quotas are an especially  bad 
form of restriction  because  they may convert  a potential  into an actual 
monopoly. 
67. Harry  G. Johnson, "The Possibility  of Income  Losses from Increased  Efficiency 
or Factor Accumulation  in the Presence  of Tariffs,"  Economic  Journal,  Vol. 77 (March 
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Finally, Tullock has enumerated  other costs related to protection.68 
First,  the system  imposes  administrative  costs. Second,  if public  funds  are 
less efficiently  engaged  than  private  funds,  the transfer  of funds  from  indi- 
viduals  to the government  will  cause  losses  not measured  in the deadweight 
loss calculations  discussed  earlier.  Third,  the  redistribution  from  consumers 
to producers  may not increase  the welfare  of the latter  since  they will be 
willing  to invest resources  in lobbying  for protection  until the marginal 
return  on the last dollar so invested  is equal to the likely return  of the 
transfer.  Consumers,  on the other  hand,  interested  in protecting  their  own 
surplus,  may be willing  to invest  similarly.  While these expenditures  may 
be rational  from the point of view of the economic  agents  involved,  they 
are wasteful  for society  as a whole.  This is particularly  true  since  a highly 
efficient  industrial  organization  and successful  lobbying  for protectionism 
may be very close substitutes.  To the extent  that firms  believe  that these 
two things  are close substitutes,  industrial  efficiency  is impaired. 
This paper  has not considered  a full general  equilibrium  approach  to 
trade restrictions,69  which includes  the effects of monetary  policy and 
financial  assets. It has examined  only the cost of trade restrictions.  But 
since policy analysis  involves relative  comparisons,  in order to  decide 
whether  an alternative  policy should  be used to achieve  the goal of trade 
restrictions,  the  present  value  of its costs  should  be compared  with  the costs 
calculated  here.  The high costs of one policy  have  no meaning  in isolation 
from  cost comparisons  with  others. 
This  paper  has already  addressed  the argument  that trade  policy should 
be used to correct  the aggregate  unemployment  problem.  A word is in 
order  on the effects  of trade  barriers  on the U.S. distribution  of income. 
Trade  liberalization  would improve  the U.S. job mix, with a shift toward 
a larger  proportion  of higher-wage  jobs.70  But  because  it would  alter  the  job 
68. Gordon Tullock, "The Welfare Costs of  Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft," 
Western  Economic  Journal,  Vol. 5 (June 1967),  pp. 224-32. 
69. See, for example,  Michael Mussa, "Tariffs,  the Distribution  of Income, and the 
Balance of Payments"  (paper delivered  to the Workshop  in International  Economics, 
University  of Chicago,  July 18, 1972; processed),  and the studies on real balances  and 
currency  devaluations  in the extensive  work by Rudiger  Dornbusch,  especially  "Deval- 
uation, Relative  Prices  and the Real Value of Money,"  Report 7130 (University  of Chi- 
cago, Center for Mathematical  Studies in Business and Economics, June 1971; pro- 
cessed). See also H. David Evans, A General  Equilibrium  Analysis  of Protection:  Thle 
Effects  of Protection  in Australia  (Amsterdam:  North-Holland,  1972). 
70. As noted earlier,  production  wage rates  per hour in 1967  were $3.16 in the export 
industries  and $2.66 in import-competing  industries. Stephen P. Magee  699 
mix, a reduction  in trade  barriers  would  probably  lead to a redistribution 
of income  away  from low-wage  earners.  In this context  trade  restrictions 
are probably  progressive  taxes. There  are several  exceptions  to this rule. 
First, very  high wage rates  are paid in some quota areas:  Data from the 
Trade  Relations  Council  show that in 1967 wages in SIC 29, petroleum 
and coal, were $3.89  per hour, and in SIC 3312, blast furnaces  and steel 
mills, they were $3.98 per hour. There  are also some low wage rates in 
areas  where  restrictions  on U.S. exports  (particularly  agricultural)  are  high. 
Second, Norman S. Fieleke has found that the U.S. tariff structure  is 
slightly  regressive  on the consumption  side.7'  The regressivity  is probably 
not great  enough  to offset  the progressivity  on the income  side, however. 
Thus,  the gains  from  freer  trade  are  partialiy  offset,  in the absence  of fiscal 
mechanisms  to compensate  those  who  lose from  it, by a less  equitable  distri- 
bution  of income. 
Summary 
The quantitative  findings  in this study  are  summarized  in Table  13. They 
indicate  the following  costs to the United States  of existing  and proposed 
trade  restrictions: 
First,  the average  annual  cost of U.S. import  restrictions  is $3.3  billion  to 
$5.0  billion.  The  bulk of this is due  to quotas  and quantitative  restrictions. 
In the short run (one to five years),  the gains from eliminating  tariffs  on 
directly  competitive  and other nonquota imports is partially  offset by 
$330 million  per year in labor transition  costs. After transition  costs, the 
United  States  could  gain $2.7  billion  to $3.6  billion  per  year  by eliminating 
quotas. 
Second,  the present  discounted  value  of the costs of restrictions  on non- 
quota U.S. imports  is $33.1 billion. If these restrictions  were eliminated, 
over a third of the gain would  be obtained  before  the fifteenth  year. The 
present  value of the cost of U.S. quota restrictions  is $88 billion; if they 
were eliminated,  U.S. welfare  would increase  in present  value by nearly 
$37 billion  before  the fifteenth  year. 
Third,  foreign  tariffs  on exports  of manufactured  goods cost the United 
States  relatively  little-$300 million  to $500  million  per year,  or a present 
value of $11.4 billion. However,  foreign  restrictions  on U.S. agricultural 
71. "The  Incidence  of the U.S. Tariff  Structure  on Consumption,"  Public  Policy, Vol. 
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exports  cost the nation $4 billion to $5 billion per year; this present  dis- 
counted  cost is $125  billion  and if it were  eliminated,  U.S. welfare  would 
increase  by $53 billion  within  fifteen  years. 
Fourth,  the total  costs to the United States  of existing  tariff  and quota 
barriers  to trade  average  $7.5  billion  to $10.5  billion  per  year.  The present 
value  of these  costs is $258  billion,  $107  billion  of which  is imposed  before 
the fifteenth  year. 
Fifth,  the total  welfare  cost to the United  States  of the Burke-Hartke  cut- 
back of U.S. imports  from 1971  to 1965-69 levels would be $3.4 billion 
to $6.0 billion per year.72  These imply a present  value of $101 billion, 
$52 billion  of which  accrues  in the first  fifteen  years  after  enactment. 
Sixth, the proportional  quota provision  of the Burke-Hartke  proposal 
would cost the United States $1.1 billion per year in the first five years, 
$3.5  billion  per  year  in the second  five  years,  and $7.0  billion  per  year  in the 
third  five  years  after  enactment.  The  present  discounted  value  of these  costs 
is $28  billion  within  the first  fifteen  years.  The  calculations  were  not carried 
beyond  that point  because  the losses  were  growing  faster  than  the discount 
rate. This makes  the proportional  quota an especially  dangerous  form of 
restriction  because  of the cascading  loss effect  and  the political  tendency  to 
keep quotas  on long after  they have achieved  even short-run  objectives. 
Seventh,  after  subtracting  the costs of the tariffs  eliminated  with Burke- 
Hartke  enactment,  the net additional  welfare  cost of the proposal  is $6.9 
billion to $10.4 billion per year, or a present  discounted  value of $129 
billion, $80  biliion  of which  comes  within  the first  fifteen  years  after  enact- 
ment. 
Finally,  if Burke-Hartke  were  enacted,  the  total  annual  measured  costs of 
restrictions  on U.S. trade  would  be $15  billion  to $21  billion  per  year;  this 
has a present  value  of $387  billion,  $187  billion  of which  would  come  in the 
next  fifteen  years.  These  calculations  emphasize  that  quotas  impose  greater 
costs than tariffs  because  (1) foreigners  capture  part of the revenue  that 
would have been generated  by an equivalent  tariff;  (2) quotas stimulate 
monopoly behavior;  (3) they hide the actual rate of protection given, 
which tends to be high; and (4) this implicit  rate of protection  usually 
grows  through  time.  The last two points  are important  since  the efficiency 
losses of all restrictions  are proportional  to the square  of the rate of pro- 
tection:  Doubling  restrictions  quadruples  the social  costs. 
72. These  numbers  equal  the "cutback"  line in Table 13 minus  the "tariffs  eliminated." Comments  and 
Discussion 
C. Fred  Bergsten:  I would  like to stress  and discuss  further  Magee's  own 
warning  that the gains of free  trade  calculated  in the paper  grossly  under- 
estimate  the actual  gains  to the United  States.  As Magee  mentioned,  three 
major  elements  are omitted  in his analysis-dynamic  effects,  economies  of 
scale,  and  monopoly  effects.  These  may  provide  very  large  additional  bene- 
fits  that  should  be added  to the overall  estimate  of the potential  gains  from 
free trade. Preservation  of competition  is particularly  important  for the 
United States because  some of the quota items, especially  steel, are the 
products  of highly  oligopolistic  industries  in which  foreign  supplies  may  be 
the only  source  of real  competitive  pressure.  The sectoral  effects  implied  by 
Magee  also merit  special  attention:  The existing  restrictions  were  costing 
consumers  about $18 billion  per year,  a bit more than the estimate  in my 
own earlier  paper  cited  by Magee  because  of his higher  estimate  of the con- 
sumer  costs of present  U.S. tariffs,  while  their  benefits  accrued  to a limited 
number  of special interests,  before the administration  wisely began to 
liberalize  the oil and  meat  quotas  to help  fight  inflation. 
Magee's handling of the "tariff-equivalent"  revenue  issue should be 
emphasized.  When  tariffs  are  increased,  part of the reduction  in consumer 
surplus  is captured  by the additional  tariff  revenue  the government  collects; 
the result  is "only"  a transfer  within  the economy.  But with quotas,  the 
scarcity  premiums  that drive  up prices  must be divided  between  U.S. im- 
porters  and  foreign  exporters,  and  the  division  is indeterminate.  The  foreign 
supplier  always  gets some share  of the higher  price  triggered  by the quota, 
and may even  get all of it. Foreign  suppliers  are particularly  likely  to cap- 
ture  the larger  part  of the  reduced  U.S. consumer  surplus  under  the favored 
new approach  of "voluntary"  export  restraints,  where  the foreign  country 
rather  than the importing  country  administers  the controls.  In the case of 
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the textile  restraints,  for example,  Japanese  firms  with  quota  allocations  are 
selling  export  tickets  to one another  (just as oil importers  sell them  to one 
another  in this country).  The price  of the tickets  derives  from  the scarcity 
premiums,  suggesting  that most if not all of the price increases  from the 
U.S. quotas  are being captured  by Japanese  producers  rather  than being 
transferred  within  the U.S. economy.  This  transfer  from  U.S. consumers  to 
foreign  exporters  must  be added  to the deadweight  loss in calculating  the 
national  loss to the United States  from  the quotas. 
Perhaps  the most important  reason  that  the gains  from  free  trade  may  be 
understated  by Magee  is that trade  policy  is unstable.  The United  States  is 
virtually  certain  to get increased  protectionism  unless  trade  is liberalized. 
Thus any calculation  of the benefits  from  reducing  tariffs  and other  trade 
barriers  must include  the avoidance  of the costs of increasing  tariffs  or 
quotas  such as those proposed  in the Burke-Hartke  bill. Indeed,  when  the 
administration  asks  for  new  trade  negotiating  authority,  its major  motive  is 
to avoid the Burke-Hartke  bill. If it were necessary  to try to eliminate 
tariffs  completely  in order  to head off the Burke-Hartke  quotas,  as some 
administration  officials  have  implied,  the gains  from  free  trade  would  equal, 
at a minimum,  the  sum  of Magee's  calculations  of the costs  of present  tariffs 
plus the cost of Burke-Hartke  itself. 
Magee's  calculations  also have  interesting  implications  for the feasibility 
of a new reciprocal  trade  negotiation.  They  suggest  that the elimination  of 
duties  by the United  States  would  raise  U.S. imports  by about $15 billion 
annually  over the longer  run ($8 billion of "competitive"  imports  and $7 
billion of "noncompetitive"  imports).  The elimination  of foreign  duties 
would  raise  U.S. exports  by roughly  the same  amount  ($6 billion  for  manu- 
factured  exports  for industries  where  exports  were  a substantial  portion  of 
sales, $5 billion for agricultural  exports,  and some additional  amount  for 
the remaining  one-half  of all manufactured  exports).  Thus  a move  to elimi- 
nate  all duties  would  appear  to come  reasonably  close  to meeting  the test of 
reciprocity,  at least  from  the standpoint  of the United States. 
Lawrence  Krause:  Magee's  effort  to calculate  the incalculable  is the first 
serious  attempt  to measure  the effects  of trade  restrictions  and  it deserves  to 
be encouraged.  Of course,  a lot of  judgments  are  called  for along  the way  in 
making  these calculations.  Although  I trust Magee to make these  judg- 
ments,  my guess  is that  the losses  due to existing  restrictions  are  somewhat 
overstated  in his paper. 704  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 3:1972 
Magee's  discussion  and estimation  of welfare  concentrate  on the eco- 
nomic  inefficiency  side of the story and virtually  ignore  the income  redis- 
tribution  side.  The gainers  and losers  are  not the same  people,  so there  are 
genuine  redistributive  effects.  One  can argue  that another  way  to offset  the 
redistribution  can always  be found,  but that  is a cop-out.  The political  sys- 
tem will not provide  full compensation  for the losers, and the problem 
cannot  be assumed  away.  My guess  is that the income  redistribution  pro- 
duced  by the  tariff  system  yields  some  positive  welfare  gain.  In any  case,  the 
actual  distributive  effects  need  to be investigated  and  taken  into account. 
No matter  how hard  one tries  to give the devil  his due, I think  Magee  is 
absolutely  correct  in rejecting  the  unemployment  argument  in favor  of trade 
restrictions.  Fundamentally,  trade  restrictions  are always  inflationary  and 
the only reason  we have  excessive  overall  unemployment  is because  of the 
inflation  problem.  Furthermore,  the unemployment  argument  for trade 
restrictions  supposes  that job opportunities  must be created  in specific 
products  (generally  manufactured  ones)  where  excess  capacity  exists.  That 
is not the way  cyclical  recoveries  in fact  create  jobs. During  the past  twelve 
months,  manufacturing  output  has grown  more rapidly  than overall  out- 
put, but the increase  in employment  in manufacturing  has been only 
500,000,  or less than 3 percent,  compared  with an overall  increase  of 2.4 
million, or fully 3 percent. 
A word  is in order  regarding  the use of trade  restrictions  as means  of ac- 
complishing  social  goals.  For example,  many  argue  that oil quotas  may  be 
justified  for national  defense.  In fact,  they  have  worked  in the wrong  direc- 
tion.  What  could  be a stranger  policy  than  using  more  domestic  oil in peace- 
ful times instead of saving it for national defense?  On the other hand, 
Magee's infant industry  argument  cannot be dismissed  simply on the 
grounds  that a subsidy  is a better  mechanism;  one must  recognize  the dis- 
torting  effect  of the extra  taxes  that  would  be required  to produce  the reve- 
nues  to pay  the subsidy.  More  generally,  any  move  toward  free  trade  would 
require  customs  revenue  to be replaced  by some other  taxes, which  may 
create  consumption  distortions  that  in part  offset  the gain. 
I think  the studies  of the impact  of existing  quotas  that Magee  relies  on 
grossly  exaggerate  the costs. The key assumption  in these  studies  relates  to 
the foreign  supply  elasticity  to the United  States  and is weakest  when  per- 
fect elasticity  is assumed  (as is often  the case).  These  are  managed  markets 
that cannot be described  adequately  by elasticity  parameters.  Quota-free 
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in the world  oil market,  and one cannot  reasonably  assume  that the price 
the United  States  would  pay for imported  oil would  be unaffected.  Magee 
finds  the greatest  costs by far on the quota  side, but I seriously  doubt  the 
quality  of the calculations  he has to rely  on. The estimates  Magee  uses for 
the benefits  to the United States from increased  agricultural  exports  if 
barriers  were  removed  are  probably  just as shaky  as those  for the costs of 
import  quotas.  But I believe  they convey  the right  message:  Here is the 
most  significant  potential  welfare  gain  to the  United  States  from  freer  trade. 
When  one looks at the side of increased  restrictions  such  as the Burke- 
Hartke  bill, the quantitative  economic  costs are not as important  as the 
political  impact.  Burke-Hartke  would  make  foreign  trade  policy  a strictly 
domestic  issue,  unilaterally  set  by the  United  States  wlth  no further  negotia- 
tions with other  countries.  This arrangement  would  have  tremendous  im- 
plications  for international  economic  relations  that cannot  be captured  in 
any estimate  of the welfare  loss. 
I conclude  that  moving  to freer  trade  may  be worth  something,  but  not a 
great  deal;  however,  more  restrictions  may  cost a very great  deal indeed. 
Therefore,  we should  want  to stay  just about  where  we are.  But,  as Bergsten 
pointed  out, we cannot  stay  where  we are  because  the political  situation  on 
trade  policy  is basically  unstable.  We have to negotiate  in order  to avoid 
going  backward.  But  we should  not want  to achieve  completely  free  trade, 
because  we could only backslide  thereafter.  We should really want to 
negotiate forever,  reaching  agreements  before presidential  elections to 
demonstrate  that  we have  not merely  wasted  time  and  effort. 
General  Discussion 
Paul  Wonnacott  shed light on why the welfare  costs of existing  tariffs 
tended  to appear  relatively  small.  He emphasized  the  point  that  the welfare 
triangles  depend  on the  square  of the  tariff  rate  and  thus  when  tariffs  are  cut 
by 50 percent,  the welfare  costs are reduced  by 75 percent.  In contrast  to 
quotas,  which  have  grown  in importance,  tariffs  have  been  cut  substantially 
since  the 1930s;  and consequently  their  remaining  welfare  costs are  under- 
standably  small. 
A number  of participants  commented  on the importance  of various  fac- 
tors  that  are  omitted  in Magee's  analytical  framework.  Wonnacott  felt  that 
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especially  for certain  U.S. exports  like aircraft.  Lawrence  Klein  mentioned 
that  other  types  of U.S. trade  restrictions  can,  like  imports  and  quotas,  have 
significant  welfare  costs.  Among  these  he pointed  to restrictions  on the use 
of foreign-flag  vessels  and  export  promotion  subsidies  such  as DISC.  On  the 
other hand, Klein questioned  the assumption  that foreign  supply  to the 
United  States  is highly  elastic;  that  did  not square  with  the evidence  follow- 
ing our  devaluation,  when  many  foreign  producers  simply  cut their  export 
prices.  Alfred  Reifman  was  concerned  that  the estimated  cost of the Burke- 
Hartke  proportional  quota provision  underestimated  the impact of this 
seemingly  reasonable  provision.  A ceiling  that prevented  each type of im- 
port from increasing  its share  of the U.S. market  would soon restrict  im- 
ports  as sharply  as the original  cutback  to 1965-69  average  levels,  since,  for 
many  goods,  imports  could  be expected  to continue  to rise  much  faster  than 
domestic  production.  Reifman  also suggested  that  the Common  Market  ex- 
perience  might  be studied  to appraise  the  magnitude  of dislocation  costs  in- 
volved  in moving  toward  free  trade.  It was  his impression  that  the evidence 
was reassuring. 
Magee's  treatment  of job dislocation  costs evoked a number  of com- 
ments.  Wonnacott  stressed  that increased  imports  can compete  either  with 
industries  that  are  experiencing  excess  demand  or with  those  that  have  idle 
resources.  Increased  imports  that  alleviate  shortages  in bottleneck  areas  can 
ease overall  inflationary  pressures  and  thereby  make  it possible  to have  less 
restrictive  fiscal  and monetary  policies,  and therefore  higher  levels of eco- 
nomic activity.  In that sense, such additional  imports  can actually  create 
jobs. On the other  hand,  if pockets  of excessive  unemployment  exist  in cer- 
tain  industries,  additional  imports  that  compete  with  these  industries  would 
clearly  subtract  from the aggregate  employment  total. William  Nordhaus 
complimented  Magee  for making  a genuine  effort  to examine  the distribu- 
tion problem  and to identify  the industries  that would  have increased  un- 
employment.  On the one hand,  Nordhaus  felt that Magee  might  be over- 
stating  the increase  in unemployment  due to dislocation  by ignoring  the 
normal  process  of attrition  of workers  through  voluntary  quits  and retire- 
ment;  to the extent  that attrition  brought  down  the employment  total over 
time, the reduced  employment  needs of the industry  would not increase 
turnover  or layoffs.  On the other  hand,  Nordhaus  was concerned  that the 
costs were measured  entirely  in terms  of unemployment  and ignored  the 
possibility  that people who were laid off might on balance  have to take 
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The discussion  also focused  on Magee's  procedures  of discounting  and 
capitalizing  the streams  of benefits  and  costs over  time.  Franco  Modigliani 
suggested  that the proper  interest  rate should  be a social measure  of im- 
patience  since  the measurements  dealt with welfare  effects.  He felt that 6 
percent  was  roughly  the  right  real  rate  of interest  to discount  for  impatience, 
but he questioned  whether  the process  of taking  present  values  was  the best 
way to make  the calculations.  Magee  felt that this technique  was a useful 
way of looking  at the problem  because  of the sharply  contrasting  time  pro- 
files  of costs and  benefits  of trade  restriction  and  trade  expansion. 